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ABSTRACT

Title: An Exploratory Study of General Aviation Aircraft
Magneto Ignition Systems Failures
Author: Gregory Alexander Damien Fox
Major Advisor: Isaac M. Silver, Ph.D., ATP
This ex-post-facto, archival, single-case, research study explored early
failures of magneto ignition systems in the training aircraft fleet operated by FIT
Aviation, LLC (FITA). In 2012, an increasing number of early magneto failures
prompted FITA to outsource the overhaul work to a specialty overhaul provider.
Despite contracting out the overhauls, the early magneto failures continued to
increase.
Archival data, from the beginning of 2007 through the first quarter of 2017,
came from engines logbooks associated with 48 Piper aircraft. Archival data were
grouped into four categorical variables by aircraft type. A total of 518 magnetos,
separately mounted as left or right magneto on each engine, provided two nominal
variables, having a total of 313,000 individual magneto-operating hours logged
during 157,850 flight hours.
A benchmark of 600 service hours was used as the maximum service life of
magnetos between overhauls. Magnetos with more than 600 service hours were
excluded from the sample data as were magnetos removed when an engine was
iii

removed from the aircraft for overhaul or major repair. Of the remaining sample set
(n=319), magneto replacements before 450 service hours were classified as early
failures (n = 178). The mean time to failure for early failure was 250 hours.
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) results indicated that aircraft type was not a factor.
A lack of detailed information concerning magneto conditions at overhaul
precluded this study from identifying specific factors behind the early failures. The
conclusions were that it would be possible for the flight school to reduce the
financial losses and schedule disruption impacts by lowering the magneto overhaul
interval, reducing the risk of an in-flight magneto failure.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Purpose of Study
The purpose of this research was to explore failures of the magneto ignition
system (MIS) on general-aviation (GA) aircraft at F.I.T. Aviation, LLC (FITA).
Figure 1.1 shows the frequency and trend of the 319 magneto replacements made
before reaching 600 hours of service during each of the 10.25 years of data.
This research used a single-case study to examine and assess magneto
failures and replacements in Piper aircraft at FITA and the company’s practices to
reduce the failures. The researcher examined 100% of the maintenance records for
all the Piper aircraft in the FITA fleet over a 10.25-year period. The aim of this
research was to understand the problem and propose a way to avoid the costly and
dangerous magneto failures.
The aviation industry has used MISs in one form or another for over 100
years. Users generally assume them to be relatively robust and reliable. For many
years, the installation of two independent MIS on each small airplane, pistonengine powerplant has met the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) prescribed
regulatory certification requirement for redundancy in the event of failure of one of
the systems (Civil Aeronautics Board [CAB], 1949, Federal Aviation Agency,
1959; FAA, 2017).
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Figure 1.1
Magneto Replacements a on Combined FITA Fleet b as a Function of Year
120
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Note: Based on data collected in this study at FIT Aviation, Inc. showing the large increase
in magneto replacement which prompted this research. n = 319.
a

Excludes magnetos with more than 600 hours in service, and magnetos removed with

engines. b Excludes PA-28-200 Arrow.

Nevertheless, breakdowns of MISs continued to occur despite existing
precautions, noting that a dual installation doubles the chance of a failure of a
single part of the system. The researcher could find no published reliability data for
the magnetos. Lack of information on a benchmark made it impossible to determine
whether the systems operated as reliably or safely as intended. Past failures of these
systems in the GA fleet have resulted in some catastrophic and sometimes fatal
aviation accidents, which could occur again (NTSB, 2017). Advisory Circular AC
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23.1309-1E (FAA, 2011) proposes a method of showing acceptable means of
compliance for performance-based certification approvals of new designs of
aircraft and components. However, the recommended process was neither legally
required nor retroactive, topics further discussed in Chapter 2.
A search of the literature found no published research studies dealing with
MIS failures. Because the problems kept occurring and were affecting flight
operations safety, as the researcher, I decided to explore the failures.
A single-case study was conducted at FITA using the school’s aircraft
maintenance records and safety report records. Readers not versed in the
technology covered in this study and who would like a deeper understanding of the
subject matter may refer to Chapter 4 in the Aircraft Maintenance Technician
Handbook–Power Plant Volume 1 (FAA, 2018, pp. 4-1 to 4-39).
Background
The researcher had two objectives. The first was to understand the MIS
failures experienced within FITA’s aircraft fleet and their impact on FITA’s
operations and maintenance resources. The second was to understand the strategies,
methods, and techniques adopted by FITA to mitigate safety risk, prevent failures,
and examine the cost-effectiveness of those strategies and their relationship to
operational safety. The researcher’s literature search in 2017 and 2018 was unable
to find any published analysis of losses to operators related to the effects of dealing
with and mitigating the safety hazard of MIS failures.
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Unmitigated, unexpected, or poorly understood failures affecting aircraft
propulsion systems can result in catastrophic safety hazards to flight crews,
passengers, or persons on the ground. An MIS in-flight failure in a single-engine
airplane is hazardous because it may result in engine stoppage and a forced landing
or ditching away from an airport. Partial in-flight failures, including small
component failures, can be indicative, contributory, or causal factors in serious
safety events. Even a failure of what may appear to be a simple, small part within
an MIS can quickly escalate to present a substantial hazard.
A 2016 serious incident case file found in Safety Management System
(SMS) Investigation Reports described such a hazardous event. During a night
single-engine aircraft training flight flown in extensive clouds over southern
Florida, the pilots faced a very urgent in-flight emergency (F.I.T. Aviation [FITA],
2017a). A short circuit inside the ignition starter control switch resulted in total and
immediate loss of all engine power. The fault was intermittent and caused an
electrical grounding and a simultaneous shutdown of both MISs. As the pilots were
about to check the ignition-starter switch, the engine restarted and ran long enough
to land the airplane safely at a nearby airport. After taxiing off the runway, the
pilots rechecked the ignition switch; this time, the engine stopped and would not
restart. All persons involved were pleased by the fortunate recovery and safe
landing. Nevertheless, the event clearly illustrated the safety hazard of a night-time,
gliding, engine-out descent from low overcast clouds that would have left little time
to select an emergency landing area.
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The potential consequences were magnified by flying over a densely
populated urban area along Florida’s Atlantic Ocean coastline. If the engine had not
restarted in flight, the result of the failure could have been an extremely hazardous
night forced landing or a ditching at sea with a high likelihood of fatalities. The
tiny spring that failed to remain seated and hold the ignition switch coil’s primary
winding contactor in place in the ignition switch was smaller than a small paper
clip.
FITA’s safety and maintenance records contained numerous examples of
aircraft ignition system problems (FITA 2017a, 2017b). The consequences varied
from in-flight diversions to other airports and engine shutdowns during landing
deceleration. The latter was one of the contributing factors associated with enginecompartment fires due to poor throttle handling techniques during attempts to
restart engines after unintended engine stoppages. Most ignition system failures or
impending failures detected before flying, including those that happened with FITA
airplanes in flight did not result in accidents. Nevertheless, losses resulting from
costs associated with aircraft recovery, aircraft repair, unscheduled maintenance,
lost revenue due to time out of service, and delayed training times can and did
result from ignition system failures. Before this study, the losses had not been
systematically identified, tracked, estimated, or analyzed.
Fortunately, FITA’s MIS failures have not resulted in lost lives or aircraft.
However, a review of the NTSB accident records showed that this had happened
elsewhere and indicates that vigilance rather than complacency is needed (NTSB
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2019). There is indeed no reason to believe that FITA or any other flight school is
immune from the critical possibility of an in-flight ignition system failure.
Most magneto ignition system problems get detected during pre-flight
checks of engine performance or periodic inspections by mechanics. The failures
generally resulted in the planned flights being delayed or cancelled and aircraft
removed from operations for repair. Although early detection of failures by pilots
performing pre-flight checks resulted in lower in-flight hazard exposure because of
the subsequent corrective repair before flying, the failures still resulted in financial
losses for the flight school. Improved loss prevention measures are difficult to
develop without a clear understanding of the failures.
Rationale
In the years following 2011, FITA’s safety and maintenance records
indicated that the FITA aircraft fleet had been experiencing MIS failures more
frequently than in the past. FITA’s experienced pilots and airplane mechanics
recognized that engines were stalling more often than before. Maintenance received
more fault reports, and more frequent safety occurrence reports, known as
Operational Mishaps and Incident Reports (OMIRs), were submitted when the
failures affected flights. The data extracted from the aircraft maintenance records
indicated that, despite FITA’s compliance with the magneto manufacturer’s revised
service bulletin (Slick, 1991) that recommends special, periodic maintenance
checks at 100 in-service hours and overhaul at 500 in-service hours, these actions
did not reduce the early replacement frequency.
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In 2015, employing a somewhat granular approach, a cursory analysis was
conducted using FITA’s safety database and aircraft maintenance records to
quantify the number of unexplained engine-stoppage events reported between 2009
and 2015 (Fox & Hart, 2015). The analysis indicated that the safety problem of
engine stoppages in flight and on the ground became more frequent after 2011. The
maintenance records showed that fuel flow restriction between carburetors and
engines was one cause of some engine stoppages. FITA maintenance personnel
discovered defects in the manufacture of some new carburetors. Using carburetor
replacement and seasonal adjustments of the fuel-air idle mixture to compensate for
ambient air temperature differences helped. Engine stoppages continued. Fox and
Hart’s (2015) cursory analysis indicated that the remaining engine stoppages could
be because of MIS failures.
The author did not find any published research about magneto failures.
Some aviation magazines occasionally carried brief articles about magneto failure
(Aeronautical Repair Station Association [ARSA], 2017; Matthews, 2000; Seeley
and the CAFE Board, 2001). A singular exception was Schwaner's (2013) book that
described magneto failures from a maintenance perspective. Schwaner described
problems related to poor maintenance and indicated enough safety concerns about
MIS failures to merit further research.
Numerous published technical advisory documents exist, including the
following: manufacturer’s service bulletins concerning special maintenance or
inspection procedures, airworthiness directives for mandatory maintenance actions
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or precautions, and operating manuals that instruct pilots how to check for
serviceability of MIS (ARSA, 2017; Champion, 2017; FAA, 2006; Slick, 1991).
The intent of most of the documents is to help prevent failures. However, despite
compliance with the applicable preventative measures, magneto failures continued
to be experienced in the FITA fleet.
Extent of the Problem
The researcher did not consider MIS failures to be unique to the FITA
aircraft examined in this study. Many thousands of similar aircraft operate in the
U.S. general aviation fleet (Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2016). This
exploratory single-case study of the FITA experience with magneto failures
investigated a problem that may similarly affect all small aircraft using similar
MISs.
Chapter 4 of this study refers to private conversations between the author
and FITA aircraft mechanics that expanded the author's understanding of the
magneto failures and magneto maintenance. Overall, this research examined the
effectiveness of the flight school’s responses to the failures. It identified estimated
costs associated with magneto failures, indicated whether better prediction of the
service life of the magnetos could lower the costs of losses, and examined the
benefits and costs of options for changing the current preventative strategy against
in-service failures.
Continuous improvements in procedures and prescriptive rule sets have
worked for the safety of the U.S. air transport industry for many years. However,
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the FAA realized that approach to safety mitigation required a change because it
had reached its limits of effectiveness. In 2009, the FAA announced
recommendations for revisions to the CFR Part 23 Small Aircraft certification rules
and standards in a report (FAA, 2009). One of the FAA's (2009) reasons for
pursuing the recommendations for revision of Part 23 was given in the report: “Few
parts have life-limits, and even fewer small airplane parts have in-service hours
tracked" (p. 7).
Over the few years after 2009, the industry and regulators became involved
in moving to a more dynamic, performance-based approach to aircraft certification.
Hopefully, this study will demonstrate that increased safety could result if GA
airplane maintenance moved to a more data-driven, predictive, Safety Management
Systems approach, aiming for preventing in-service failures. Adoption of more
accurately targeted preventative maintenance using life limitations for parts and
components would avoid or reduce the risk of in-flight failures.
Definition of Key Terms
Aircraft magneto ignition system: A complete aircraft magneto ignition
system consists of two separate magnetos and their internal and external
components or parts, including the shafts, gears, cams, magnet(s), coils,
condensers, distributors, points, contacts, ignition switches, impulse couplers, seals,
gaskets, fasteners, casing, ignition harnesses, shielded ignition leads, and spark
plugs.
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Aircraft types: For this study, the four aircraft types in the FITA fleet were
the: Piper PA-28-161 Warrior, Piper PA-28-181 Archer, Piper PA-28-200 Arrow,
and PA-44 Piper Seminole. The first three are single-engine aircraft, and the fourth
is a two-engine aircraft. All are fitted with engines manufactured by the Lycoming
company (Piper,1995a, 1995b, 2006, 2013).
Data sources: The data sources for the study were (a) the flight school's
archived engine maintenance records for the current and previous aircraft that made
up its fleet for the 10.25 years, from the beginning of 2007 to the first quarter of
2017 (FITA, 2017b); (b) the records of the flight school safety program's reports,
from 2013 to 2017, involving magneto-ignition system failures (FITA, 2017a); and
(c) contextual information from personal discussions with two aircraft mechanics to
better understand maintenance practice at FITA.
Early failure of magneto: For this study, early failure is operationally
defined as a magneto removed from an engine with less than 450 hours in service.
Excludes magnetos removed with engine.
Impact (costs) of magneto ignition system failures: For this study, the
estimated opportunity costs of magneto ignition system failures included (a) actual
magneto cost per service-hour, (b) additional cost of labor, and (c) opportunity
costs of lost flight revenue (see Table 4.13).
Magneto ignition system (MIS): See: aircraft magneto ignition system
above.
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Magneto ignition system failures (MISF): A magneto ignition system
failure in this study is a recorded failure requiring replacement due to the magneto
not meeting the operating performance parameters or for any other reasons.
Magneto ignition system failure rate (MISFR): For this study, this is a
targeted variable, calculated as the average time in operating hours from initial
installation on an engine to failure or replacement of a magneto or magneto ignition
system component. It may be shown for the entire fleet, for a single aircraft type,
for an individual year, or all years, and measured in hours from the first installation
to removal. Notably, each time, before an engine goes for overhaul, the magnetos
are removed and, after the overhaul, gets an entire new magneto ignition system
(MIS). Whenever the engine goes for overhaul at the end of its useful life or due to
engine failure, that engine's magneto ignition system effectively ends its time in
service and gets counted as a replacement. When the engine is put back on the
aircraft, mechanics install a new or an overhauled magneto ignition system set.
Magneto ignition system time between failures: Magneto ignition system
time between failures is defined as the difference in time, in operating hours, from
the recorded hours at installation until the recorded operating hours at the time of
removal for replacement or repair of the MIS, or the end of its allowable service
life when its aircraft engine goes for overhaul.
Other variables: Within the context of this study, these are any other
variables that may have emerged from (a) analysis of data, (b) private discussions
with the mechanics, or (c) any other unanticipated variable identified.
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Targeted variables: The variables include the MISF rate for (a) each aircraft
type, (b) for the fleet, (c) any differences in the failure rate between aircraft types,
and (d) any differences in the failure rate(s) by year. The targeted variable is the
most appropriate MIS overhaul interval.
Time between overhauls (TBO): In this study, for engines, the time
between overhauls (TBO) means the stated maximum allowable engine service life
(e.g., 2,200 operating hours) when the engine must be removed from the aircraft
and overhauled. For magnetos, the time between overhauls means 500 plus 100 or
minus 50 operating hours.
Units of data collection: The data collection units consist of the FITA
records of aircraft magneto ignition system's time to failure or replacement
measured as time of service in hours.
Useful life: For a magneto, this is operationally defined as 600 hours in
service.
Variables: The nature of exploratory research is that new variables may
emerge that can be defined and explored during data collection and analysis
(Creswell, 2013).
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research Questions. The overarching research question was the following:
What will an exploratory study of failures of aircraft magneto ignition systems
using a single flight school as the sample reveal? More focused research questions
were as follows:
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Research Question 1. What is the failure rate of the flight school's magneto
ignition systems expressed as mean time between failures of magnetos or MIS
component(s) fleet-wide, by aircraft type, by year, and over 10.25 years?
Research Question 2. What does the distribution pattern of the magneto
ignition system failures indicate yearly and overall?
Research Question 3. What effects have magneto ignition system failures
had on the flight school’s operations and maintenance resources?
Research Question 4. What is the most appropriate overhaul interval for the
magneto ignition systems?
Research Hypotheses
According to Patton (2002), “Analytic induction offers a specific form of
inductive analysis that begins deductively, by formulating propositions or
hypotheses, and then examines each particular case in-depth to determine if the
facts of the case support the hypothesis” (p.94).
This study examined MIS failures from several perspectives expressed in
numbered research hypotheses from the above research questions, and each
corresponds to the similarly numbered research question.
Hypothesis 1. The mean time between MISF will be lower than the
manufacturer’s recommended overhaul interval when examined as an entire fleet,
by aircraft type, by year, and over the 10.25 years.
Hypothesis 2. The MISF will not have a normal distribution pattern over
10.25 years or by year, nor will the MTBF be the same each year.
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Hypothesis 3. The MISF will have caused losses of flight school resources.
Hypothesis 4. There will be a more appropriate MIS overhaul interval than
one currently used by the flight school.
The data, constituting the facts of the case, were examined against the
hypotheses and the research assumptions. The overarching research hypotheses for
the study were that (a) an identifiable underlying pattern for the MIS failures could
be detected through the exploratory research method, addressed by hazard
mitigation and, (b) more than one way to mitigate the hazard resulting from the
failures may be available. Gharajedaghi and Ackoff (1985) stated:
The performance of a system is not the sum of the independent effects
of its parts; it is the product of their interactions. Therefore, effective
management of a system requires managing the interaction of its parts,
not the actions of its parts taken separately. (pp. 23-24)
The researcher must examine an entire system for causes of failures, and
similarly, the search for solutions must include the effects on the system. This ex
post facto exploratory research examined failure rates, and the methods and models
used did not involve statistical proof of causal factors underlying the failures.
Seeking causal factors was not the goal and was neither intended nor possible given
the nature of available data. The causal determination remains for experimental
researchers in future studies.
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Study Design
The study collected archival records. Exploratory, single-case research was
the design used, with the case being a single collegiate flight school in Florida,
FITA. The entire FITA Piper-aircraft fleet equipped with Slick magnetos
constituted the accessible population, and the sample was a census because one
hundred percent of them were included. The data originated from two sources: the
primary source for the units of analysis, magneto operating time to failure or timedout replacement, was the FITA maintenance logbooks. The secondary source was
the FITA safety report records that provided a descriptive context of some failures
in flight (FITA 2017a, 2017b). The researcher extracted the MISF systems failure
data from 10.25 years of the flight school’s official aircraft engine maintenance
records (FITA, 2017b). The data extracted from the engine maintenance records
consisted of the time in service of the ignition system components measured in
their hours in-service and, if found, the identified reason for failure or replacement.
The researcher examined the FITA's safety program records for information on
magneto failures (FITA 2017a). Brief descriptions of some magneto failures in
later chapters came from the author's personal discussions with mechanics while
they were working on the magnetos. The researcher used descriptive and inferential
statistical methods to investigate, analyze, and present information from the data
obtained from the maintenance records. Aircraft types constituted four categorical
variables, left or right magnetos constituted another two nominal variables, and the
Time in Service was the dependent variable (Cohen et al., 2003). Description of the
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personal discussions with the aviation mechanics reflected the author's recollection
of those discussions (Ary et al., 2010, Creswell, 2010, Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
Because of their relevance to the proposed study, the pilots’ standard operating
procedures (SOP) and the maintenance mechanics’ usual maintenance
responsibilities related to MIS were described where necessary, with references to
any source documents. The researcher also examined and reported the MIS
components and parts supply background, MIS repair and overhaul intervals, and
FITA's operating and maintenance policies and practices.
The FAA safety regulatory requirements and FAA policy environment on
MIS and any relevant changes that may have affected the preceding were examined
and reported. Different approaches were taken under Part 25 Transport Category
aircraft certification rules and processes compared to Part 21 type and product
certification (FAA, 2017a). Part 23 small aircraft certification rules and procedures
concerning the reliability of components and their safe operating life changed to a
performance-based requirement in 2011 (FAA, 2011). The FAA (2011) describes
the new reliability requirements for systems and component failure on small GA
airplanes and this study compares the failures of the magnetos to the new
requirements.
Estimated repair times and opportunity costs of the early magneto failures
originated from the author's discussions with FITA managers. The estimates
included maintenance costs, possible downtime costs, and recovery costs if the
failures occurred away from the maintenance base.
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Significance of the Study
The researcher aimed to discover the factors related to GA aircraft MIS
failures. Very little evidence of focused, published research on those system
failures during the past 110 years is available, so perhaps this study was seminal
research. The author expected that FITA would employ any new knowledge from
this research to reduce the operations and maintenance costs resulting from MIS
failures and improve flight safety by reducing the risk of failed magnetos. The
adoption of more targeted inspections and maintenance processes for MISs might
reduce the frequency of premature failures and, more importantly, prevent in-flight
failures.
Whitehurst (2013) argued that single-case research in aviation is a costeffective method for exploring a variety of aviation system problems and making
valuable additions and contributions to knowledge. The FAA enabled new
paradigms for future GA aircraft safety certification in the FAA’s project to rewrite
FAR 23 around performance-based metrics rather than prescriptive standards. It is
possible that donor funding might materialize for more single-case research into
GA equipment failures.
The author found no information on magneto reliability on the Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE) website, www.sae.org. In 2011, the FAA published
its latest version of the FAR Part 23 system safety analysis and assessment
guidelines for Part 23 airplanes (FAA, 2011). The FAA guidance in 2011 extended
only to new products and airplane certifications and did not extend retroactively to
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affect the past certification of products unless they were related to a change in the
original approved type design. With the new, performance-based regulation
philosophy adopted by the FAA and with no available benchmark to measure
magneto performance, the researcher decided to compare the results of this study
against the FAA's new, recommended measures for safety analysis and assessment
of new products.
The FAA based its 2011 recommendations for certification on a risk matrix
composed of airplane classes, probabilities, and severities of failure conditions.
Using the risk matrix, the airplane magnetos examined in this study fell under Class
I, single reciprocating engine airplanes weighing 6,000 pounds or less, and Class II
multiengine reciprocating engine airplanes weighing 6,000 pounds or less. No
regulations specify that a Part 23 airplane's equipment must meet targeted
reliability standards.
The potential for finding more safety benefits using single-case research
methods would be valuable for the approximately 175,000 GA aircraft in the U.S.
fleet and many thousands of GA aircraft in other nations. This study originated
from concern that deficiencies exist in magneto ignition system reliability or
durability that could require further engineering attention by manufacturers.
Perhaps the safety regulatory authorities charged with aircraft design and
equipment certification should have more clearly defined performance standards
for magneto ignition systems. The implication for FITA is clear enough: applying
the new knowledge from this study will improve safety. By extension, this will also
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provide similar safety benefits to flight schools across the U.S. that use the same
magneto ignition systems by reducing airborne magneto failures.
The study examined practices and strategies used by FITA to prevent or
mitigate MIS failures. Findings from this study may convince FITA to develop or
employ new strategies to lower the risk of loss due to unplanned early replacement
of magnetos and lower the risk of in-flight failures.
Statistically speaking, generalizability to other populations or different
ecological settings is unlikely because the researcher delimited the study to a single
case contained in 10.25 years of FITA’s fleet-maintenance records of aircraft
operated year-round in Florida. Nevertheless, the findings from the study may have
some practical significance and interest for other flight schools that use similar
aircraft and that have experienced MIS failures.
An ideal sample would have included MIS failure data from more flight
schools located in different geographic and climatic conditions, including colder,
drier, or higher elevations (Cohen et al., 2003). Although a study using a more
representative sample of the entire population would be desirable in research, the
availability may be unlikely because most flight schools tend to guard safety and
maintenance records from competitors. Alternatively, a good sample for a
comparative study would come from a flight school that enjoyed similar
maintenance performance to that provided by FITA's maintenance department,
which has been awarded FAA Diamond Awards eight times for maintenance
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excellence. In the future, a cluster sample from a few other U.S. flight schools
willing to participate in research related to MISF issues would be informative.
The researcher lacked resources in time and funds to pursue an ideal sample
and the opportunity to perform experimental research. Despite the constraints of
this study, the researcher believed the data could add value to the current state of
knowledge. Whitehurst (2013) made a clear argument favoring single-case research
design as an efficient and effective method of conducting applied aviation research.
He also expressed support for single-case experimental research. This single-case,
exploratory research design might serve to guide replica studies elsewhere. This
study offers a simple guide to MIS replacement cycles, which could model lifecycle preventative maintenance of a variety of GA aircraft engine components and
accessories certified under Part 23. This type of modelling could help address a
deficiency noted in the FAA’s Part 23 Small Airplane Certification Process Study
(2009). The results of such future research might also support any recommendation
flowing from that study (FAA, 2009) related to life-limiting some parts and
tracking components' in-service hours on small GA airplanes. With that said, the
subject has not been closed, and the FAA has published at least two iterations of
the guidance for performance-based certification, with the latest being AC No.
23.1309-1E (FAA, 2011).

20

Study Limitations and Delimitations
Limitations
The study did not use a random sample, so the results would be statistically
non-generalizable, confining the applicability of the findings and recommendations
to FITA. Despite that, the findings and recommendations will likely be helpful for
other flight schools or even the wider GA community operating similar aircraft.
Delimitations
The researcher delimited the study to a single case consisting of one flight
school, FITA, in Florida, using a sample of one hundred percent of 10.25 years of
FITA’s aircraft maintenance records for all FITA's Piper airplanes using Slick
magnetos. The study was also delimited to the identical magneto ignition system on
Piper aircraft with different Lycoming 4-cylinder piston engines (Champion, 2018;
Piper, 1995a, 1995b, 2006, 2013). Generalizing the findings is not possible due to
the delimitation. As previously stated, the reason for delimiting the study to the
sample in the single case was the lack of financial and time resources to undertake
a more comprehensive exploration. Fortunately, FITA provided ready access to the
research data.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Introduction
This chapter contains an overview of the search for underlying theory, a
review of prior research into MIS failures, and a description of other related
descriptive, technical literature that helped the researcher prepare for the study. The
chapter describes the scarcity of prior published research studies on the chosen
topic, concludes with a summary of findings from the literature review, the
implications of the expected study results, and why the study was necessary. The
researcher concluded that the scarcity of published research meant an exploratory
approach to the study was the most appropriate choice.
Creswell (2013) explained that exploratory research seeks to discover
relationships to develop a theory or build on an existing theoretical base to advance
knowledge. One of the desirable outcomes from any research is that it may lead to
practical applications of new knowledge. In this study, the outcomes may help
improve safety and guide maintenance strategies to minimize the risk associated
with ignition system failures. This study contains recommendations in later
chapters that are action-oriented and problem-solving in nature. This chapter also
outlines why the information required by technical theories of reliability of electromechanical aircraft systems precluded the employment of a more experimental
approach. There is usually an expectation that exploratory research will perhaps
generate new ideas or even link to existing theoretical models as it proceeds
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(Creswell, 2013). This literature review examined the methodologies and
conclusions from available studies of general aviation aircraft safety and reliability,
seeking to employ and incorporate that knowledge and similar methods for this
study if possible.
Overview of Underlying Theory
The study of failures of electro-mechanical subsystems that serve aircraft
engines is typically an engineering reliability study. Those studies compare failure
data with a known design reliability goal or a known design life target for the
subsystem and its components. Because of uncertainty associated with loads and
resistance and the randomness of operational demands in service, the engineering
design of a complex system is not a simple challenge (Haldar & Mahadevan, 2000).
Engineers must consider strength and loads. Their creation must meet the criteria
for performance, safety, serviceability, and durability under the demands that it will
encounter during operations.
Haldar and Mahadevan (2000) noted that using a risk-based design format
is not uniform across engineering disciplines. Typically, designers expect a riskbased design to operate within its design load limits. In other words, it must be, for
want of a better term, deliberately overbuilt so that its failure limit due to overload
or structural failure will occur sufficiently above its daily operating demands to
provide a reasonable safety factor. They did not and probably should not have
specified who should be responsible for determining the acceptability of the risk.
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Manufacturers know the risk-based design parameters for aircraft piston
engines and associated electro-mechanical subsystems such as MIS. The
information is certainly not in the public domain. Engine limitations, such as the
maximum allowable number of engine hours of operation before it needs to go for
an overhaul, are mandated and known as the time between overhauls, or TBO.
Occasionally, the owner or operator of an aircraft piston engine may be
granted an FAA approval to continue to operate the piston engine in service beyond
that maximum overhaul time on condition that it is checked regularly and continues
to meet certain minimum performance parameters. A specific, acceptable level of
risk for MISs with design approvals issued before 2011 does not appear to be
mandated by the FAA (FAA Engineer in Atlanta Office, personal communication,
April 18, 2017). The decision as to whether a defined acceptable level of risk
should be public information is probably within the purview of legislators, safety
regulatory authorities, and perhaps even in patent law. As noted later in this study,
the FAA has chosen not to take a very detailed, prescriptive approach concerning
the reliability of aircraft piston engines and their subsystems. The difficulties of a
one-size-fits-all regulatory approach are enormous given the number of
components, parts, aircraft types, and manufacturers. It becomes much more
complex considering the number of modifications each of those systems may have
undergone over the years and the number of companies other than the original
equipment manufacturer that may now be permitted to manufacture replacement
parts under a Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA) (FAA, 2010). That reality
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placed a constraint on this study because the researcher was unaware of the risk
factors contemplated by the designers of the magneto ignition subsystem. There
was no clearly defined or stated acceptable level of risk of failure and its effect on
the entire aircraft engine’s safety and reliability. The primary safety concern for an
engine subsystem failure relates to the likelihood of subsequent total loss of the
aircraft engine in flight.
As stated, this exploratory research used quantitative statistical analysis of
maintenance data. Personal discussions with aircraft mechanics assisted the
researcher in understanding a realistic context for the maintenance experience with
the MISs. An exploratory approach had to be used due to the researcher’s lack of
access to any proprietary design reliability data from manufacturers and lack of
access to any internal manufacturer’s studies of systemic or component
breakdowns if such records existed at all.
During the preparation for the study in 2016, the researcher had telephone
conversations (unrecorded) with customer service representatives from two of the
well-known magneto repair and overhaul shops. FITA had its magnetos overhauled
at one of the shops. The information offered by the company representatives
indicated that neither shop retained detailed tear-down information during the
overhaul process. That was unfortunate for this study because that type of
information would have been helpful to identify individual MIS parts that wear out
or fail in service more frequently than others. The magneto overhaul service
representatives said their companies could provide detailed tear-down information
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for an overhauled magneto but would only do so when requested by the customer,
and few customers ever asked for this service (Quality Aircraft Accessories, Inc.,
personal communication, April 18, 2017; Airmark Components, Inc., personal
communication, April 19, 2017).
In 2016, the FITA maintenance department manager advised the researcher
that FITA had never requested tear-down data from overhaul shops and FITA had
no official records of parts failures in the magneto. As a result, this study began
without an a priori measurement baseline for data comparison or classification
against design engineer, manufacturer, or regulatory authority prescribed reliability
targets (if any) for the MISs and components. The researcher was left to identify, ex
post facto, a baseline for reliability expressed as a more appropriate overhaul
interval. To determine the service life expectancy of FITA's MISs, the researcher
sought a baseline from an analysis of FITA’s fleet maintenance data, safety data,
pilot SOPs, and maintenance practices and policies.
A somewhat similar situation was faced by Pettit and Turnbull (2001) when
they completed a contract study for NASA to explore macro-level failures in GA
aircraft systems in order to estimate GA aircraft component reliability. Their study
was intended as a precursor to guide the development of component reliability
targets for application to future GA aircraft designs (Pettit & Turnbull, 2001). Their
study used a somewhat coarse, granular approach to produce post hoc estimates of
aircraft reliability for engines, airframes, instruments, wings, and empennage, each
of these classified within their study as an aircraft component. They used official
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accident data and maintenance data provided by aircraft owners and faced the same
problem encountered in this study: the lack of a priori reliability information.
Therefore, they were obliged to develop estimates of GA aircraft reliability from
their post hoc analysis of historical maintenance and accident data. They canvassed
flight schools and GA organizations for data and used aircraft maintenance data
provided by aircraft owners or operators. They defended their method of obtaining
data, stating that they considered the data they received to come from a
representative random sample, and generalization from their conclusions was
possible.
By comparison, this single-case study had much finer detail by using data
related to the ignition subsystems that together comprise a vital subcomponent of
an aircraft engine system. Pettit and Turnbull (2001) stated they used a haphazard
method to obtain data to provide randomness for their sample. By comparison, this
study data originated by using all FITA Piper aircraft with their Slick magnetos as a
census sample rather than seeking a more representative random sample by seeking
data from several flight schools. This study could not replicate their approach to
sampling because, without the influence of the NASA name, persuading operators
to provide their maintenance data would have been difficult. The researcher had
neither the resources nor the name of NASA standing behind this research.
Furthermore, the researcher found no detailed regulatory reliability
performance specifications in FAR 23 that apply to the magnetos in this study.
There were no regulatory standards to guide the manufacturers to develop a
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baseline for reliability to measure risk and determine acceptability of the risk of
MIS failures. The same applies to estimating the failures' predictability or
comparing the failure rates against the design goals.
The U.S. armed forces published its required reliability specifications for
equipment and components in a document of military specifications (MILSPECS)
(Office of the Secretary of Defence, 2009). A comprehensive review of U.S.
MILSPECS online indicated that the U.S. military does not specify reliability
criteria for piston-engine aircraft ignition system components as a MILSPEC.
Setting zero tolerance for failure offers an ideal reliability target that may be
desirable but impossible.
Airborne failures of MISs and consequent in-flight loss of the engine
present a hazard that is tempered only by the regulatory requirement for the
redundancy provided by a dual ignition system (FAA, 2017a). Perhaps this
situation developed because of FAA's broad scope approach the FAA and its
predecessor, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), adopted when structuring the
regulations related to aircraft ignition systems, as discussed later in this chapter.
Review of Past Research Studies
In 1897, a German engineer named Otto Bosch completed the first recorded
replacement of a battery-powered ignition system using an MIS on an automobile
engine (Matthews, 2000). The automobiles that existed in 1897 did not have
generators or alternators, and their engine ignition systems’ dependence on the
battery severely limited the range of the vehicle to a very few miles or a few
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minutes of running time lasting until the battery fully discharged. Bosch’s
invention was a significant advance in limiting the vehicle’s range and endurance
only by fuel capacity and fuel demand because magnetos do not rely on battery
power; they generate their electricity.
Twenty-one years later, at the end of WWI, the aviation industry
experienced rapid growth in aeronautical technical knowledge and new aero-engine
designs. Shoemaker (1927), writing only nine years after the war, noted that
“development of ignition equipment especially adapted to aircraft engines has only
begun” (p. 13). Today, MISs are part of almost all aircraft piston engines, with a
few others being equipped with electronic ignition systems that use computer chips
to control the ignition timing.
This study did not examine electronic ignition systems. FITA retrofitted a
few aircraft with electronic ignition systems by replacing one electro-mechanical
magneto of the two fitted. FITA found this pairing problematic, so FITA mechanics
returned to using two electro-mechanical magnetos.
A search for studies of the ignition system problems of small aircraft piston
engines found no research studies related to the subject other than trade magazine
articles or blog posts. Schwaner's (2013) book was a notable exception. He
introduced his technical book on aircraft MIS with a clear call to alarm. According
to Schwaner (2013):
Since 1985 the National Transportation Safety Board has cited magnetos as
a cause or factor in 92 accidents involving 22 fatalities and 21 serious
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injuries. This is surprising in that only one magneto is required to operate
the engine. Yet possibly this is the problem. Because the magneto is
considered redundant there is a tendency to operate it until it fails.
Magnetos are reliable and provide a redundant safety factor, but they have
the potential of causing engine failure if they are not inspected and serviced.
When the magneto bearings fail on one obsolete magneto model, the rotor
seizes causing the gear teeth inside the engine to break. The broken gear
uncouples both magnetos causing instant engine shutdown. Worn impulse
coupling rivets can cause engine failure when the impulse coupling engages
in flight…. When we open magnetos for overhaul, we see that many are not
receiving proper preventative maintenance. (p. 3)
Schwaner (2013) described the accident data between 1985 and 1992, but
he did not include injuries or aircraft damage data. The 2013 edition was a reprint
of his original 1992 book and did not update the accident data to 2013. Therefore,
the researcher searched the online Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident and incident reporting
databases from 1992 to 2016 using “magneto failure” as a specific search parameter
(FAA, 2017c; NTSB, 2017). The two databases contained 24 reported accidents
caused by MIS failures, an average of one per year. The 24 accidents resulted in 4
fatalities, 9 serious injuries, 11 minor injuries, and 24 destroyed or substantially
damaged aircraft. The more recent annual number of accidents, including those
with fatalities, appeared lower than those in the data cited by Schwaner (2013).
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However, to draw a definitive conclusion from the data was not possible without a
better understanding of other variables that may have factored into the failures of
MISs since Schwaner’s (2013) examination of the 1987 to 1992 data.
Nothing in the aviation literature indicated that the hazard posed by MIS
failures had disappeared. Australia issued an airworthiness bulletin in 2014 that
warned of the dangers associated with MIS failures (Civil Aviation Safety
Authority [CASA], 2014). The researcher found no published information that
indicated whether anyone had identified MIS failure trends or predictors (FAA
2017c, NTSB 2017). An absence of failure trend and predictor information
increased the difficulty of identifying and assessing safety mitigation actions.
Manufacturers receive failure information when maintenance organizations
provide Service Difficulty Reports (SDR) (FAA, 2017d). Collecting SDR data
helps manufacturers develop service bulletins (SB) communicating recommended
best practice information to assist users to avoid, or at least minimize, operational
or maintenance problems with a product. An SB is not mandatory in the legal sense
for operations conducted under CFR Part 91, although following advice provided in
a manufacturer's service bulletin is a reasonable practice for aircraft operators.
The FAA is aware of service difficulty reports and manufacturer’s service
bulletins and is legally empowered to intervene if a product affects flight safety.
When the FAA identifies a defect affecting flight safety, it may issue an
airworthiness directive (AD) ordering mandatory action to address the problem
(FAA, 2006, 2012). AD compliance is required: there are penalties for non-
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compliance by the aircraft owner and for pilots who fly an aircraft outside the AD
instructions. The rules of conduct and offense-creating regulations included in
national aviation safety regulations apply (FAA, 2017a).
Unrecorded anecdotal remarks made to the researcher by FITA maintenance
department mechanics during discussions during the researcher’s investigations of
safety occurrence reports indicated that the mechanics believed magneto problems
had become more frequent over the past few years (R. Kern, personal
communications, September, various dates, 2016). Although they presented no firm
evidence for their opinions, those remarks were one of the reasons this research
included more discussions with mechanics.
The literature searches for this study had not revealed any research reports
dealing specifically with MIS failu res or reliability. However, the researcher's
examination of NTSB and FAA databases had unearthed a few accident reports that
cited magneto failures as causal factors. With so little in the literature to indicate
what is happening to explain the safety and accident reports that involved MISs,
including the anecdotal information from the researcher's discussions with
mechanics, this research study was not only justifiable but necessary.
The U.S. Government published the previous rules for GA aircraft's MIS in
the former CAB Civil Air Regulations (CAR), Part 3, and Part 13 (CAB, 1949;
Federal Aviation Agency, 1959) and the current Federal Aviation Regulations, 14
CFR Parts 21 and 23 (FAA, 2017a). The present FAA rules do not enable detailed
implementing standards for magneto construction, performance, and reliability.
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Presumably, those attributes were left to the engine and magneto ignition system
manufacturers in 1934 and remained so until 2011, as discussed later.
A search of the FAA Technical Standards Orders (TSO), Parts
Manufacturer Approvals (PMA), and FAA Administrative Orders revealed none of
these directly or specifically address MISs. The FAA-PMA homepage on the FAA
website (FAA, 2017b) contained the following statement:
Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA) is a combined design and production
approval for modification and replacement articles. It allows a manufacturer to
produce and sell these articles for installation on type certificated products. Federal
Aviation Administration Orders 8110.42 and 8120.22 prescribe the approval
procedures for FAA personnel and guides applicants in the approval process.
The FAA rules for PMA do not specify performance or reliability standards
for MISs. The FAA's PMA records contain the approvals in lists of frequently
changed corporate ownerships. The difficulty was that PMAs are not listed by
brand or product name but rather by corporate ownership. Finding the PMA for a
product when ownership of the original brand has changed a few times due to
corporate mergers, buyouts, and other changes can be difficult (FAA, 2017b). The
FAA orders contain detailed administrative procedures for parts manufacturers to
follow to gain FAA approvals. For example, an applicant for a PMA must present
various forms of evidence containing details of the quality systems and
manufacturing processes involved in building the parts. In effect, the FAA policy
places the burden of proof on parts manufacturers, who had to prove the suitability
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of their product for installation on the original equipment covered by a design
approval or type certificate.
The process to gain FAA approval to use a different manufacturer’s
replacement component on a previously certificated engine product can be costly
and complicated. The FAA required the engine manufacturer to apply for and be
issued a supplementary type certificate (STC) approved by the FAA. Because the
FAA considered a magneto to be a part of an engine, the MIS was effectively
certified under the original type certificate issued by the FAA to award the engine
manufacturer airworthiness approval for the engine design even though the engine
manufacturer did not make the magnetos (FAA, 2012). In the past, the FAA part of
the certification process involved testing small aircraft engines by operating a
newly designed motor under a simulated load for 30 to 35 hours on an engine test
stand for various durations using specified power settings. A complete tear-down of
the tested engine is required to check and measure any wear and damage to its
components. Any unsatisfactory wear indication or early failures to be addressed
by modification of the design.
The original certifications of aircraft MISs took place in the 1920s and
1930s. The CAB rules in 1949 and Federal Air Agency rules in 1956 required
aircraft piston engines to have dual independent sources of engine ignition (CAB,
1949, FAA, 1959). The rule did not change substantively under the FAA rules in
Part 23 until 2011, when performance-based aircraft certification rules became
active. At that time, the FAA removed the dual independent ignition systems
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requirement (FAA, 2011). The new 2011 certification standard was not retroactive,
leaving all owners of prior type and product certifications with grandfather-rights to
their previous FAA approvals.
The new certification process uses performance and risk-based assessment
methodology, described in FAA Advisory Circular AC No. 23.1309-1E, issued on
November 17, 2011 (FAA, 2011). Although the AC does not apply to FITA's fleet
of aircraft because they were type certified before 2009, the AC guides applicants
regarding the new performance and risk-based Part 23 certification requirements.
The guidance in the AC applies to new aircraft, new products, and, if a change to a
type design approval is required, to older aircraft or products.
Information and recommendations contained in FAA Advisory Circulars
are not mandatory and AC No: 23.1309-1E states that the information in the AC is
not the only means of compliance with the related aviation regulation. Other means
of compliance were not described in the AC so if an alternative means of
compliance is chosen it is the responsibility of the designers and manufacturers to
convince the FAA that their means of safety compliance is acceptable.
In the AC 23.1309-1E, the FAA's performance parameters are shown for
each class of airplane, using a 5 by 3 risk matrix of the allowable qualitative
probability of failure and the severity of the related failure condition's effects on the
airplane, occupants, and flight crew using five severity effects classifications. Then,
for each of these five qualitative classifications, the AC describes the recommended
maximum allowable quantitative probability of failure for each effect level and for
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each aircraft class. For example, a manufacturer, at the product design stage,
develops an engineering functional hazard assessment that indicates the allowable
probability of failure of a system based on the severity of the outcome of a failure.
If the functional hazard assessment for an MIS failure were classified as having a
major effect on safety, a hazardous effect on safety, or a catastrophic effect on
safety in a small single-engine airplane, the allowable probability of failure would
be less than 10-4, 10-5, and 10-6 respectively. Although this method of FAA
certification is not, and was not, applicable to the aircraft in this study, the
allowable failure probabilities just described will be discussed in Chapter 4 with the
findings. That discussion will examine whether the FITA magneto failures
analyzed in this study would meet the new allowable probability of failure
guidance (FAA, 2011).
An explanation of component reliability specification was found in Murthy
et al. (2009). The specification of reliability appeared to be a normal part of product
engineering. However, because the FAA did not set standards for reliability in the
years prior to 2009, and even after 2009, they only recommended guidelines, the
new recommended qualitative and quantitative target based on severity and
probability of failure appeared to have shut magneto manufacturers out of the
certification loop.
In order to clarify the PMA practices, the FAA issued a policy document in
2010 that reinforced FAA Order 8110.54A (FAA, 2010). The new policy was
intended to ensure that original Design Approval Holder (DAH) or Type Certificate
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(TC) holders could no longer insist on restricting operators of their products to use
only the DAH or TC manufacturers’ original equipment manufacturer (OEM)
replacement products by specifying that restriction in their Instructions For
Continuing Airworthiness (ICA) (FAA, 2010). The policy also required
manufacturers to make their ICA available to the industry (FAA, 2010). The
change offered new options for repair stations and operators to use non-OEM parts
and components that were provided by new PMA holders rather than the original
DAH or TC holders. The policy move was hailed by the Aeronautical Repair
Station Association (ARSA) and noted in its industry publication (ARSA, 2013) as
an attempt to open and level the parts market more fairly and improve the
availability of basic safety information. However, the information on MISs
manufacturers’ performance and reliability goals remained proprietary and was not
shared with the public. That same proprietary confidentiality has continued to
impede the understanding of MIS failures due to the lack of a publicly available
benchmark from which to measure MIS performance and reliability.
Piper’s aircraft manuals specify magneto ignition operational performance
in terms of Demonstrated Maximum Allowable Engine RPM Drop limitations
(Piper, 1995a, 1995b, 2006, & 2013). Pilots check each MIS prior to flight by
testing against those performance limitations. However, even satisfactory magneto
checks during the preflight checks would not guarantee that system failures could
not occur during flight. The check was simply meant to alert and preclude the pilot
from flying an aircraft that had a faulty MIS.
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The researcher examined the FAA airworthiness information available from
the FAA online library of airworthiness directives (AD) and instructions for
continued airworthiness (ICA) and searched the manufacturer’s service bulletins
(SB) related to MISs (Champion, 2017; FAA, 2006; FAA, 2012). The following
search terms were used: magneto, magneto components, aircraft ignition systems,
ignition harnesses, and spark plugs.
The FAA library review in 2017 resulted in finding 22 ADs using the search
term magneto and none when using any of the other search terms. Four of the 22
ADs thus retrieved in 2017 related to Slick magnetos, and only one AD issued in
1982, related to the specific magnetos in this study, the Slick 4370™ model, and is
no longer on the AD list in 2022, having been withdrawn or superseded. The 1982
AD recommended inspection and overhaul in accordance with the manufacturer’s
instructions. In 2022, four of the current sixteen Champion-Slick magneto service
bulletins (SBs) relate to the current model of Slick magnetos fitted to the FITA
aircraft in the study (Champion Aerospace, 2012, 2015, 2018, 2021). In 2017, the
majority of the 22 SBs were for Bendix magnetos and typically contained
mandatory instructions for aircraft owners and operators to ensure that extra
inspections were performed on the magnetos and that the magneto ignition
components be replaced after a specified interval of accumulated operating hours.
An AD issuance typically indicated a problem had been found with a system or
component’s performance, durability, manufacturing process or quality, or even its
design and deemed by the FAA to have been adversely affecting flight safety. Two
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of the four Champion-Slick SBs found in 2017 related to magnetos that were not
fitted to the aircraft examined in this case study. Notably, the FAA does not always
state the exact nature of the events leading up to issuance of an AD, although the
FAA does use general terms to justify the issuance. All four Slick magneto SBs
found in 2017, predated the 1992 NTSB recommendations to the FAA referenced
by Schwaner (2013). To explain, the Champion Aerospace SB in 2012 related to
the nylon timing gear, the two in 2015, the 2018, and the 2021 SBs related to the
metal finger electrode on the nylon timing gear.
An attempt to improve service reliability by preventative measures was
evident from the information in the two major magneto manufacturers’ SBs (Slick,
1991; Teledyne Continental Motors [TCM], 2005). The SBs recommended visual
external inspections every 100 hours of service and overhaul of magnetos including
mandatory replacement of points, coil, condenser, and rotor every 500 service
hours. The Slick SBs appeared to have been issued in response to the National
Transportation Safety Board safety recommendation made to the FAA after a series
of accidents that involved magneto failures (NTSB, 1992). Justification for an
instruction to operators to conduct MIS retrofit or replacement would probably
have been difficult for the FAA because precious little published data were found
that related to the failures of MISs. The FAA response to the NTSB was to issue a
rather general airworthiness directive telling owners and operators to conduct
magneto inspection and maintenance in accordance with the manufacturer’s
instructions. The researcher realized by this stage of the literature review that to

39

focus this research on aspects purely related to reliability of MISs would be
difficult because no clearly identified reliability baseline was available to use as a
comparator for any lifetime failure data revealed by this study.
As previously described, Pettit and Turnbull (2001) were commissioned by
NASA to conduct a study of GA aircraft reliability. Their analysis of aircraft
accidents classified the data by assigning the causes of failures to various macro
systems in the aircraft. Magneto ignition system failures were classified in within
the much broader classification of engine failures, so any MIS failures were not
specifically identified in that study. Because the NASA broad classification of
engine failures included all failures of engines and did not identify which
components had failed to cause the engine failure (Pettit & Turnbull, 2001), it was
not possible to extract information about MIS failures from their study.
Nevertheless, their research strategy and analytic strategy offered a theoretical
model the researcher considered for this study. The NASA study (Pettit &
Turnbull, 2001) found engine failure data patterns displayed a Weibull distribution
which was useful for them to develop broad estimates of systems reliability. The
Weibull distribution appeared to have good potential for further research on MISs
failures if a researcher's goal was to focus on system reliability questions.
The only other GA-aircraft reliability study located during the literature
search was a master’s thesis modelled on the 2001 NASA study methodology. It
was conducted as a replica study that used data from a small training fleet and then
compared the results to the NASA results (Stewart, 2001). The Weibull model
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distributions of failures/system reliability in Stewart’s sample appeared to have
paralleled the NASA results. Stewart’s study also used the same broad
classification of components as the NASA study, although it served as another
example of the usefulness of the Weibull model to examine failures and reliability.
The work of Grussing et al. (2016) indicated that it might be possible to
examine failure data using a Markov model that employed fault tree methodology
to analyze reliability and service life prediction. The researcher interpreted the
research of Grussing et al. to indicate that the Markov model was more suitable for
use when the designer’s reliability goals were known a priori. For the purposes of
this study, the researcher concluded that the Markov model might not be as useful
as the Weibull model in a post hoc analysis of data that lacked information on
designer’s reliability goals. As already stated, the researcher had no access to the
magneto manufacturer’s proprietary design goals for magneto reliability or
performance to use as a baseline, and this information gap precluded the use of the
Markov model in this study. The proviso was clear, there would be no commitment
to use the Markov model for data analysis in this study unless the data that emerged
from the records in this study appeared suitable for Markov model analysis. The
researcher chose not to discard the option until actual data were analyzed during the
study and the data were found to be a poor fit for the Markov model.
Summary and Study Implications
The lack of a baseline measure meant that this research had to be conducted
using an exploratory statistical method. Schwaner’s (2013) call to alarm was based
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directly on the NTSB’s safety recommendations of A-92-22 through A-92-24 made
to the FAA 29 years ago (NTSB, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c). By 2017, when the data for
this study was collected, a quarter century had passed since these NTSB
recommendations were made regarding magneto maintenance practices, and still no
clearly mandated FAA performance or reliability standard for aircraft magnetos
was in place.
The Bureau of Transportation Statistics (2016) information indicated that
approximately 175,000 general aviation aircraft were in the US. The majority were
fitted with piston engines that used MISs. Two magnetos were fitted to each
aircraft engine and the U.S. fleet included twin engine piston aircraft. A rough
interpretation indicated that approximately 400,000 magnetos were in service in the
U.S. GA fleet. Several different brands of magnetos were in use, although Bendix
and Slick products predominated in the market. Bendix products were not
examined in this study because the FITA fleet was equipped solely with Slick
magnetos.
Overhauled Slick 4370 Magnetos for small aircraft cost about $850 when a
core was exchanged and $1250 each when no core was supplied to an overhaul
shop (Quality Aircraft Accessories [QAA], 2018). Prices for overhauls varied a
little depending on the make and model of the magneto, and using the above prices
as a guide, a rough estimate indicated that the value of 400,000 overhauled
magnetos in the 2016 U.S. GA fleet ranged between $360 million and $500 million
U.S. dollars. The value of each GA aircraft exceeded the value of its magnetos by a
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factor between 30 to 200 or more, and the cost of any individual loss of life in a
fatal accident was often in millions of dollars, far outweighing the cost of losing a
small aircraft. The implication drawn by the researcher was that the potential cost
of loss due to MIS failures was high enough to justify some new research seeking
to identify cost savings and improvement in reliability and safety.
No published reason was found to explain the lack of FAA action to issue a
more specific AD following the 1992 NTSB recommendations. Discussions within
the FITA workplace with flight and maintenance managers and mechanics
convinced the researcher that Schwaner’s (2013) original call to alarm in 1992
remained equally valid in 2021.
The results of a limited, unpublished analysis by Fox and Hart (2015)
indicated a valid need for more research. The researcher's personal familiarity with
4 years of safety occurrence reports from the flight school safety database (FITA,
2017a) had revealed some unexpected MIS failures. More frequent and earlier MIS
failures for which no clear explanation existed were happening. The dearth of
published data on MISs failures convinced the researcher that a niche existed for
some original research. In the absence of prior published research and the absence
of expected service life data, an appropriate research methodology and a means of
obtaining information and data were needed for an exploration of MISs failures.
The researcher had worked as the Director of Safety at the same flight
school where the research study was conducted. Because of his duties, he held a
strong, vested interest in this study. The MIS failures affected the (a) dispatch
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reliability, (b) maintenance costs, (c) safety of the aircraft, and (d) training progress
and safety of pilots and flight students served by the flight school’s safety
management program.
The main implication the researcher recognized in view of the scarcity of
past research and the lack of a baseline target for failure rates for this study at its
proposal stage, was that it would be necessary to use statistical analysis to explore
the data for relationships or patterns. The researcher believed that this approach
might lead to the generation of theory or results that could be explained using an
existing reliability theory with post hoc data analysis rather than experimentation,
the latter not being possible under the circumstances. The scarcity of prior research
during the literature search suggested a possibility for this study to be original,
seminal research. Because MISs have been fitted to internal combustion engines
since Bosch first invented the magneto and have undergone little technological
change since the mid to late 1930’s, the researcher wondered if they had simply
been taken for granted.
Alternatively, perhaps the more vivid magneto failure results have been rare
enough not to have reached prominence among other cause factors in the GA
accident records. Possibly the magneto failures had been obscured by broader
classifications or attributions of cause factors. Given the many years since the
1930s, it was time for another look at the success of magnetos.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
Overview
The problem addressed by this research was outlined in Chapter 1 as being
the need to have a better understanding of an outbreak of early failures of magnetos
experienced at FITA and determining the likely tangible and intangible costs of the
failures on company resources. The research questions described in Chapter 1
required choosing a sample and collection of data from that sample for analysis.
The sample was a census because it included all the magneto records from
all the Piper aircraft in the FITA fleet. The sample data were contained in the
engine maintenance technical logbook records for all 54 Piper aircraft operated by
FITA between 2007 and the first quarter of 2017. Some information was also found
in a few of the OMIR safety occurrence reports contained in the FITA Safety
Management System (SMS) database and from discussions with FITA airplane
maintenance mechanics. Cost information related to the resource losses from
magneto failures on FITA airplanes was obtained during the researcher’s personal
discussions with the maintenance and flight training departments of FITA.
Estimated costs were used to develop an order of magnitude total cost estimate
using the results from the various analyses of magneto failure data.
The data collected from each of the many engine technical logbooks was
classified by aircraft type and left or right magneto. For the analysis the
independent variable was a single categorical variable, consisting of aircraft type,
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and had four levels, one for each of the aircraft types. A nominal variable,
consisting of left or right magneto, provided two more levels for each aircraft type,
for a total of eight levels. The dependent variable was the magneto time in service
until failure or replacement of each magneto.
A second check of the collected raw data for accuracy, completeness, and
integrity of the magneto time in service calculations for each magneto on each
airplane was completed by the researcher sampling five airplane records and
comparing the data against the same data previously collected from the same
logbook sources. The entire data set included data from all 48 Piper airplanes
having a total of 54 engines, collected from more than 70 engine technical
logbooks for the airplanes during the 10.25-year period. There were more than 54
engine technical logbooks because a new engine technical logbook must be started
whenever an engine is replaced due to failure or reaching its service TBO limit
when a replacement engine is installed. The only time a new logbook is not started
is when a working engine is removed from one airplane and installed on another, in
which case the engine logbook reflects the change to the new airplane.
The 10.25 years of airplane engine technical logbooks provided the entire
raw dataset for magneto times to failure and/or replacement. The arithmetical
calculation of the time in hours of service beginning at magneto installation until
the removal for failure or replacement of each magneto was recorded and each of
the measurements became a unit of analysis, and served as the dependent variable
for the statistical models.
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A preliminary statistical analysis of the entire raw data set was completed.
The manufacturer’s recommended 500-hour overhaul interval was chosen as the
expected service life and was extended to 600 hours to reflect the real practices of
the FAA approved maintenance practices that allowed FITA to overhaul magnetos
anywhere between 450 and 600 hours. Based on this information, the decision was
made by the author to operationally define any replacement before 450 hours of
service as an early magneto failure.
Given that 450 to 600 hours was the expected service life; two smaller data
sets were developed containing only those magnetos replaced under 600 hours of
service and those replaced with less than 450 hours of service. Any magneto
removed or replaced between 450 hours and 600 hours was considered to have
reached its normal overhaul time. The data set consisting of magnetos removed or
replaced before 450 hours of service was considered by the researcher as early
replacements that did not reach the expected service life, therefore defined as early
failures.
Using the sample of all magnetos with less than 600 hours of service when
removed or replaced, the sample was divided into groups of left and right magnetos
for each of the four airplane types, resulting in eight groups in total. Each group
was examined individually for distribution patterns and descriptive statistics.
Following that examination, all groups were used in an analysis of variance
(ANOVA) of the group means to determine whether group membership was a
factor affecting failure times. When the data were grouped by airplane type the
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sample sets were slightly unequal in size, so randomization and downsizing of the
larger groups and substitution of the mean for a very small number of missing data
points was done for the two smaller groups to bring each group to an equal sample
size of n = 35. The dependent variable in the ANOVA was the mean time in service
before removal or replacement.
Cost in resources was developed using expected number of failures in 50hour intervals and then estimating benefits from avoiding early failure and
additional costs of losses if the magnetos were replaced at 50, 100, 150, 200, 250
(the mean), 300, 350, or 400 in-service hours.
Finally, the results were compared to the new FAA guidance for the
performance based FAR Part 23 certification for airplanes (FAA, 2011). The
comparison sought to determine whether the failures of FITA magnetos fell within
the recommended acceptable range of quantitative statistical probability of failure
(FAA, 2011). The results of these calculations are reported in Chapter 4.
Rationale for the Procedure
The researcher examined 10.25 years of MIS failure records contained in
the archived and current FITA aircraft fleet engine maintenance technical logbooks
for 48 Piper aircraft and identified N = 518 magneto replacements. The 518 events
constituted the original raw data set that was examined to determine the descriptive
statistics, statistical distribution patterns and the frequency of failures over the
10.25 years.
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No clearly defined published life expectancy for the MISs was identified
during the literature search described in Chapter 2 of this report. A magneto
overhaul was recommended by the manufacturer at 500 service hours, and FITA
performed the overhauls in-house from 2007 to early 2012. The in-house overhauls
were not clearly recorded in the engine logbooks and may have been performed in
combination with other routine periodic maintenance checks.
Sometime between 2011 and early 2012, FITA outsourced the magneto
overhauls to a specialty overhaul company. Overhauling of magnetos any time
between 450 and 600 hours of service facilitated FITA maintenance department
scheduling of routine overhauls and minimized aircraft downtime impacts on
operations and maintenance workloads.
Every data point that recorded a magneto replacement below 600 service
hours, n = 318, was included in the model as a unit of analysis for determination of
descriptive statistics, distribution patterns and frequency of failures over the study
period. Using an operational definition of early failure, any replacement prior to
450 service hours was identified by the researcher as having been an early failure,
and a total of n = 178 early failures was identified from the raw data.
Consisting of the magneto in-service time until replacement, the data set of
all replacement events under 600 hours was classified by one of four levels of the
categorical variable based on aircraft type, and one nominal variable, consisting of
either the left or right magneto. The under 600-hour set included the data from the
entire under 450-hour replacement data subset and data for all timed-out
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replacements before 600 hours of service. This was done because when the smaller
subset of early failures was divided into 8 groups there were insufficient units of
analysis in most groups for useful statistical analysis.
The left or right magneto nominal scale was appropriate; for many years,
only the left magneto was fitted with an impulse coupler, a spring-loaded device
automatically activated during initial engine start to spin up the magneto during
low initial engine starting rpm to ensure a strong electrical current existed to
provide spark plug ignition. A difference in failure rate was expected between the
left and right magneto scales. The resulting group sample sizes were slightly
unequal. Randomization was completed using JMP™ on the six larger groups to
reduce those sample sizes to n = 35. Substitution by the mean was used on the two
smaller groups in order to equalize the sample sizes at n = 35 for each aircraft type
with only one and two substitutions being required. The resulting data were
examined for descriptive statistics, statistical distribution patterns, and analysis of
variance between and within the groups to see if airplane type and/or usage was a
factor in the early failures. In the data set n = 178, containing the under 450 service
hours replacement, data could not be examined for distribution pattern by year and
by airplane type due to the resulting very small sample sizes when the data were
separated by year. The researcher’s recollections of private discussions with FITA
aircraft mechanics were described in the narrative where the researcher needed to
clarify a description or explanation.
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Population and Sample
Population
The target population in this single case study consisted of all FITA fleet's
magnetos fitted to its Piper aircraft. They were also the accessible population and
consisted of the same MISs fitted to the single and twin-engine Piper aircraft
operated and maintained by FITA from 2007 to end of first quarter 2017. During
the 10.25-year period, some of the Piper aircraft were sold, retired, or replaced with
newer Piper aircraft. Each engine logbook maintenance record for the Piper aircraft
engines was readily available, covering the time each engine was operated by the
flight school, and these records were used as the magneto ignition system data
sources for the study.
Sample
FITA, a collegiate flight school in Florida where I was employed as
Director of Safety, was selected in 2017 as the single case for this research study.
The census sample chosen consisted of all the FITA Piper aircraft’s magneto
ignition systems operated over the previous 10.25-year period.
The data related to the systems in the sample was retrieved from each of 78
Piper airplane’s engine logbooks between 2007 to 2017. Federal Aviation
Administration regulations require owners to maintain a logbook for each aircraft
engine for the life of the engine, meaning until it reaches its time between
overhauls (TBO) or is removed due to damage or failure. The installation, repair,
removal and replacement of MISs must be recorded in the engine logbooks.
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Pertinent descriptive detail concerning in-flight operational failures was also
retrieved from available safety records that were kept by FITA between 2013 and
2017. A formal Safety Management System (SMS) was implemented at the flight
school in 2013. Since that beginning in 2013, all safety event reports have been
stored in the FITA safety department electronic and hard copy archives up to the
present time.
Similar single-case study designs had been found appropriate for applied
aviation research (Whitehurst, 2013). The raw data search found a sample N = 518
individual magneto ignition systems recorded as having failed or having been
replaced (for any reason) during the 10.25 years of records. During the 10.25-year
study timeline the data indicated that as many as 108 magnetos, 432 ignition leads,
432 spark plugs, on 54 engines, on a total of 48 airplanes, controlled by 54 ignition
starter switches were in operation in the FITA fleet at one point in time. Forty-two
single and six twin-engine airplanes in the fleet accounted for the 48 airplanes and
54 engines; each had separate ignition starter switches for each engine, hence the
54 ignition starter switches. The maintenance practice was to replace the entire
ignition lead set and spark plug set whenever an engine was overhauled, with eight
leads and eight spark plugs per engine in each set.
During the study, three maintenance employees discussed the MISs with the
researcher. By virtue of their combined 140 years of experience in aircraft
maintenance, the three employees were viewed by the researcher as subject matter
experts on aircraft maintenance and MIS maintenance. One was a manager, and the
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other two were senior line mechanics who routinely performed specialized work on
the MISs disassembly and troubleshooting. The three maintenance employees held
U.S. airframe and power-plant technician certificates and worked full time for the
FITA maintenance department. The researcher’s recollections from his discussions
with the maintenance employees are contained in Chapter 4.
Power Analysis
Parameters for power analysis were α = .05 to be held constant for each of
the hypotheses that were examined using correlational analysis, and β = .80 to be
held constant for each of those hypotheses. No effect size was proposed because the
research was not experimental.
Instrumentation
The researcher acted as the instrument for data collection from the aircraft
maintenance records. He identified and recorded airplane engine technical logbook
data related to magneto ignition system installations, failures and replacements, and
whenever possible, the symptom of failure recorded in the engine log and the
reason for replacement.
A copy of a typical engine logbook page from those examined during the
study is in Appendix A. After a new or overhauled engine is installed on an
aircraft, a new engine log starts at zero engine operating hours. Accumulated
operating time in whole and decimal portions of hours is logged whenever the
engine undergoes an inspection, repair, periodic maintenance, or post-flight check.
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Logging of the engine time since installation continues to accumulate after each
flight until the engine is removed for overhaul or replacement.
In order to calculate the operating times for the MISs, the researcher
calculated and recorded the time, in engine operating hours, from the time of the
installation of the engine until the magnetos first failed and were repaired or
replaced. Subsequently, the operating times for replacement magnetos were
measured by recording the engine times when magnetos were first installed on the
engine and the engine time at subsequent replacements, until the engine was
eventually removed for overhaul. If the magnetos were replaced due to the engine
being removed for overhaul the difference in time from engine time at magneto
installation to engine time at the engine removal was counted, but was subsequently
excluded from the data set because it was neither a failure nor a timed-out
replacement. The times recorded in the engine logbook records were found in the
labelled Total Time since Overhaul column in the engine logbooks.
The instrument used to measure the times recorded in the engine technical
logbooks is called an aircraft engine tachometer clock, which is installed in each
aircraft as original equipment and is used to indicate elapsed operating time by
measuring engine RPM mechanically and converting it to time. The clock provides
an accurate measure of magneto operating time because the magnetos are gear
driven from the engine.
Descriptive safety information related to MISF events in flight was
extracted from the FITA Operations and Maintenance Incident Report (OMIR)

54

electronic database and hard copy OMIR records maintained by the researcher. A
copy of a sample OMIR form is contained in this paper as Appendix B.
Procedures
Research design
This study’s research methodology consisted of an ex-post-facto analysis
using descriptive and inferential statistical analysis of engine maintenance data
consisting of the MIS times to failure or replacement by airplane type. Variables to
be analyzed were the differences in failure times of MISs using any replacement
before 450 in-service hours as the upper limit of a classification as an early failure.
Description of Variables
As previously described, eight data sets were generated from the four
aircraft types and the left and right magneto on each engine. The dependent
variable was the time to failure or replacement in operating hours of the magneto
ignition systems. Targeted information on the dependent variables included the
type of distribution pattern of the variables by fleet, aircraft type, year, and failure
frequency over the 10.25 years of data, and MTBF. The most important
information concerning the dependent variables was the identification of the most
appropriate overhaul interval for FITA's magneto ignition systems.
Study Implementation
The methodology was appropriate for single-case research because the
flight school (FITA) is a system that is bounded by time (several years of data) and
place, being a university flight school based on an airport in Florida. Similar
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bounded systems exist in the form of flight training organizations in Florida and
elsewhere in the U.S. operating similar aircraft types with similar magneto ignition
systems.
Threats to Internal Validity Considered
The researcher’s employment as the FITA Safety Director provided unique
access to safety event investigations so the potential for researcher bias should be
addressed. In order to avoid any real or perceived researcher bias, the researcher
decided to note any times when he felt that bias may have arisen and personally
guarded against actions that might have been construed as research bias: none were
noted.
The researcher acted as the instrument to extract the magneto ignition
system data from maintenance records. Descriptive statistics were used to examine
and report the MISs failure data. Patterns and associations in the data and
associations within and between aircraft type groups were sought. Because there
were four types of aircraft, the MISF pattern variances between the aircraft types
and over the years of the study were examined using ANOVA. The researcher
recognized that no statistically defensible causal inferences were possible from this
type of analysis. However, the results would be useful if variances were found that
might indicate external factors affected failure rates in the different types of
aircraft.
It was clear that some of the ignition problems emanated from fouled or
failed spark plugs because the maintenance data reflected changes of some plugs in
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which the magnetos were not involved. The raw data indicated that spark plug
ignition leads lasted up to 1,800 hours or more and failures were extremely rare.
The rarity of ignition lead changes between engine overhauls indicated that spark
plug ignition lead failures were not a significant factor in the MIS early failure
events.
As previously described, descriptive statistics were employed to analyze the
MISF data to seek out any common patterns of distribution and frequency of the
failures. The data were further examined using One-Way ANOVA (Ary et al.,
2010). The goal was to identify and compare differences or similarities of MIS
times to failure or replacement as they may have existed between the aircraft-type
groups and within each of the type groups by left or right magneto.
Data distribution patterns were examined for goodness of fit with normal,
log normal, and Weibull distributions. Data analysis involved preliminary
examination of the entire raw data set as first collected from the maintenance
records, in which the operating times were recorded for replacements of magnetos,
starters, alternators, spark plugs, carburetor changes, ignition lead changes, and
ignition switch changes. Recording the sequential time to replacement of each
ignition component of each engine for each aircraft on a line-by-line entry basis for
each ignition system component along a timeline resulted in the researcher having
to enter a zero value for the components not changed when another component was
changed.
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In order to prepare the data set for statistical analysis, the zero values were
removed from the raw data set to ensure the sample's values would be accurate for
each of the components. This study only used the data related to MIS components
and the raw data recorded for failures of other systems was saved for possible
future use in other similar studies.
The independent variables identified for the study consisted of the four
aircraft types as categorical group variables with each having two nominal scales
for the left and right magnetos. The dependent variables were the times of failure
and replacement in operating hours of each magneto. No treatment interventions
were made, nor was this possible in this type of post hoc study.
Yin (2014) provided numerous examples of case study and noted that the
choice of research methods was not hierarchical, that the methods could overlap,
and that the nature of the research question might preclude confinement to a sole
method. Whitehurst's dissertation (2013) concluded with the thought that singlecase research designs provided an effective and efficient experimental methodology
for applied aviation research. Whitehurst had based his dissertation on use of
quantitative research methods. By contrast, this single-case study of one collegiate
flight school used neither experimental nor interventional methods but was
confined to exploratory methods because the literature search found no definitive
published research on the failure rates of aircraft MISs. Whitehurst further asserted
that useful knowledge could be gained from single case within group research. The
assertion supported the researcher’s decision to use a single-case design with the
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expectation of gaining useful knowledge from this type of exploration of the
maintenance data. The wide flexibility, open ended potential and variety of case
study design for research was exemplified by Yin's comparison (2014) with other
research methods “Unlike other research methods, a comprehensive and standard
catalogue of research designs for case study research has yet to emerge” (p. 27).
Threats to Validity and Reliability
Threats to internal and external validity and reliability had to be considered
for quantitative methods. Because there was no random sampling from the target
population the external validity of findings was indefensible on statistical grounds
even though the findings may have appeared to be logically extendable to other
populations. According to Ary et. al. (2010):
Researchers often make the untested assumption that the sample being
examined is representative of some larger population. Assumptions about
the stability and generalizability of model estimates from the sample at hand
to the population of interest are probably more serious sources of bias than
many other more familiar or researched problems, such as variable
distribution problems. (p. 152)
Regardless of Ary’s (2010) caution above, because the sample came from a
large flight school the results of this study will provide useful information for
similar flight schools. Although external validity, ecological generalizability, and
population generalizability are important in experimental research these
considerations were not addressed in this study because this was nonexperimental,
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exploratory research. The information related to the numbers and costs of overhauls
of magnetos was supported by the failure data from the engine logbooks. Typical
task time estimates and airplane time out of service for magneto repair information
was provided to the researcher by the maintenance manager.
The maintenance records were primary source documents that had been
routinely and periodically subjected to rigorous inspections by the maintenance
director and the records supervisor, and periodic regulatory safety inspections by
the FAA. The requirement for missing data treatment from the engine maintenance
logs was not required because no instance of missing records was known.
However, in order to match sample sizes for each aircraft type, randomization and
reducing the size of larger samples and very minor instances of substitution of the
mean occurred to ensure equal sample sizes when setting the data into equal sized
subsets in categorical groups based on airplane type. The engine maintenance
records and the FITA safety reports contained some information that described the
symptoms of the failures and operational impacts, respectively, and some of that
information is captured in the narrative and analysis later in this report.
Treatment Verification and Fidelity
There was no treatment. Care was taken to ensure researcher bias did not
contaminate the research.
Data Analysis
Quantitative data were extracted by the researcher from the maintenance
records and recorded in the categories of airplane type, and measures of time in
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hours between failures or replacements of magnetos, including magnetos that had
been retired from service when engines reached their mandatory engine overhaul
time. A newly overhauled set of magnetos was placed on each newly overhauled
replacement engine. Information obtained during the researcher's personal
discussions with the two mechanics provided a practical reference framework for
understanding failures and for some of the discussion of the results of the statistical
analysis.
Descriptive Statistics
Analysis of the maintenance data was performed first by using descriptive
statistics to identify mean, median, mode, standard deviation, standard error of the
mean, distribution shapes, variances for the fleet, and variances for each type of
aircraft. The grand mean and the means for each aircraft type constituted the mean
times between replacements. The same analysis was done for the subset of data for
early failures, however, the data for left and right magnetos was aggregated in this
subset consisting of n = 178 units of analysis. An average cost associated with
early failure was developed using information provided by the FITA Operations
Department and by the FITA Maintenance Department. Changes in distributions of
failures over time were identified.
Inferential Statistics
A 4 x 4 ANOVA in JMP14™ was used to examine the differences in failure
times between the aircraft types, which were inserted as four levels of a categorical
independent variable. The mean times to failure or replacement of the magnetos
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was used as the dependent variable. All aircraft in this study were used in flight
training and it was not within the scope of this study to detail the different types of
training usage each airplane type experienced, other than recognize there may have
been slight differences in usage.
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Chapter 4
Results
Introduction
The raw data were collected by manual search for all magneto replacements
recorded in archival and, in early 2017 when data was collected, current FITA
aircraft fleet engine maintenance logbooks. Hard and soft copies of the logbooks
are retained at FITA's maintenance department. Upon review, 523 records of
magneto replacements were found. Each magneto's time-in-service from original
installation to replacement constituted the units of analysis.
Five of the recorded replacements contained in the first few years of the
10.25 years of records were discarded because their recorded time in-service
exceeded the TBO for the engines. The remaining N = 518 magneto replacement
records constituted the entire raw data set. The data were classified under the four
aircraft types used as levels of a categorical variable and by left or right magneto.
The raw data set was then cleaned by excluding 60 magnetos that had been
removed due to engine removals because the magnetos had neither failed nor
timed-out for overhaul. The researcher used 600 hours-in-service as the upper limit
for expected normal life in-service before overhaul for reasons explained in
Chapter 3, and further cleaned the data by excluding all units of analysis above 600
hours-in-service. After some initial analysis, the researcher decided to exclude the
Piper Arrow data from the early-failure data because the Arrow was permanently
removed from the fleet in 2018. After cleaning the data, there were N = 319 units of
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analysis remaining. The researcher operationally defined 450 hours-in-service as
the upper limit for early failures. Of the 319 units analyzed, 178 were classified as
early failures.
This chapter reports the results of the descriptive and inferential statistical
analysis performed using Excel™ and JMP14™ software programs on the cleaned
10.25 years of MISs data obtained from the archival airplane engine maintenance
records. The results presented as descriptive statistics included those obtained for
the fleet by combining all of the 10.25 years of data from the four different types of
aircraft, from data by aircraft type, and from data that showed the distribution of the
failure pattern of all left or right magneto failures over the 10.25-year period. The
Warrior Aspen and Warrior Avidyne had noticeable navigation and flight
instrumentation system differences. Both were PA-28-161 type aircraft but were
classified and examined as two distinct aircraft types in the study because they
were used during various stages of pilot training involving different flight profiles
and flown by students with different flight experience levels.
The inferential statistical analysis used a one-way ANOVA to examine
differences in the variances of the mean time to replacement within and between
four groups comprised of each aircraft type; each group was a category of the
independent variable. The mean time in service of all left and right magneto
replacements for each aircraft type served as the dependent variable. Because the
researcher wanted to use identical sample sizes, the n = 178 sample of failures
under 450 hours was too small to divide into eight separate sample groups and still
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have a reliable result from the ANOVA. Therefore, the under 600 hours-in service
replacement sample (n = 319) was used and grouped into eight groups (4 aircraft
categories, each with left and right magnetos) each with n = 35 units of analysis,
with a resulting total sample of n = 280.
The one-way ANOVA between the four aircraft types indicated the mean
time to replacement was approximately 350 hours for n = 280.
The distribution analysis of a sample containing only the magnetos replaced
under 450 hours, and counting all these replacements as Early Failures, indicated
the mean time to failure was approximately 250 hours, n = 178. This mean equated
to half of the 500 hours to inspection and overhaul recommended by the
manufacturer, and the overhaul interval used by FITA since 2012. The early
failures equated to 55.7% (178/319) within the under 600-hour sample and 34.4%
(178/518) of the entire raw data sample.
Descriptive Statistics
Overview
The data consisted of 518 units of analysis of measured magneto in-service
hours before replacement that together formed an accumulation of 314,409.8
magneto operating hours during the 10.25-years of records searched.
Results
Accessible Data. Descriptive statistics for the entire accessible raw-data set
are shown in Table 4.1 by aircraft type, single or multi-engine fleets, and for the
entire fleet. The analysis of all raw accessible data indicated that 277 left magnetos
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were replaced over 157,850.5 operating hours and 241 right magnetos were
replaced over 154,559.3 operating hours. As noted, all engines on the aircraft
included in the study were equipped with Slick magnetos. Using the entire raw
accessible data set, N = 518, as the sample, the preliminary descriptive statistical
analysis indicated mean times between magneto replacements of 569.9 hours for
left magnetos and 552.0 hours for right magnetos.
Conversely, it was clear from examination of the raw-data set that there
were many documented replacements at less than 500 hours, with most of these
occurring in the years after 2010. The records indicated that FITA stopped its inhouse overhaul of magnetos and contracted the service out to a specialty magneto
overhaul shop starting in early 2012, and this was confirmed in discussions with
maintenance employees.
An upper-magneto service life boundary was needed to ensure the data
would not be skewed by some large values in the units of analysis occurring in the
first 5 years of data before the 2012 contracting out decision. Such an upper limit
would be expressed as in-service hours.
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Table 4.1.
Characteristics of Accessible FITA Fleet Data
Aircraft Type
Group
PA28-161
Warrior
Aspen
Ignition
Switch
Failures

Multiengine
Fleet

Single-Engine Fleet

2

PA28-161
Warrior PA28-181 PA28-201
Archer
Arrow
Avidyne

0

0

0

Total
Single
Engine
Fleet

PA44
Seminole
Multiengine

Total
Fleet

2

0

2

Number of Magneto Replacements
Left
Magneto

81

72

49

22

224

53

277

Right
Magneto

69

55

46

22

231

49

241

Total

150

127

95

44

455

102

518

Total Accumulated Service Hours on Replaced Magnetos
Left
Magneto

49,920

42,420

17,535

14,203

127,265

30,585

157,850

Right
Magneto

48,078

42,892

18,116

14,817

127.092

27,467

154,559

Total

97,998

85,312

35,651

29,020

254,357

58,052

312,409

Mean Operating Time to Magneto Replacement
Left
Magneto

616.3

589.2

422.9

645.6

568.1

577.1

579.9

Right
Magneto

696.8

595.7

546.3

673.5

626.1

560.6

552.0

Combined

653.3

592.0

482.7

659.6

597.5

569.2

561.6

Note. Accessible data set includes all magnetos that were replaced between 2007 and
2017 regardless of service hours and regardless of why they were replaced.
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Process of Maintaining Magnetos. The manufacturer’s SB (Champion,
2017) recommended a 500-hour inspection and overhaul as required, including
replacement of points, condensers, coils, and rotors in the Slick magnetos used at
FITA. It was not possible to identify or quantify from the aircraft maintenance
records prior to 2012 whether all Slick magnetos were maintained by FITA in
accordance with the service bulletin. It was not clear from the pre-2012 records
whether magnetos were replaced only when FITA was unable to repair a failed
magneto or replaced when an engine replacement was required due to early engine
failure or due to an engine reaching the specified time between overhauls (TBO).
When engine replacements occurred, both magnetos would be removed and
overhauled in accordance with the manufacturer’s limitation that specified that
magneto life could not extend beyond the engine TBO.
Notably, starting in early 2012, FITA ceased performing in-house overhauls
of magnetos at 500 hours service intervals as recommended in the manufacturer’s
SB and began contracting out to an overhaul service provider. The manufacturer’s
magneto life limitation, of magnetos not remaining in service beyond the engine
TBO, was complied with by removing magnetos when an engine was sent for
overhaul and sending the magnetos for overhaul by the contractor. When the
engines cores were returned from being overhauled FITA installed overhauled
magnetos on the engines. Data that showed the time in service on magnetos when
engines were sent for overhaul was extracted from the database for information and
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those magneto replacement times were counted with all other replacements, but
only in the raw data set and not in other analyses.
From 2012, FITA removed and replaced a magneto between 450 and 600
hours in service and sent them for overhaul to Quality Aircraft Accessories (QAA),
a commercial provider of that specialty service. This practice provided a parameter
for an estimated service life. A lower limit of 450 hours and an upper limit of 600
hours was selected as the range of a normally expected service life of the magnetos
being maintained under the new contract. The selection was made because
overhauling magnetos within a range of 450 to 600 hours of service was an
acceptable practice and the FAA allowed routine service intervals (500 hours) to be
carried out with some degree of flexibility within the normal maintenance
schedules. Slick's magneto overhaul SB was a recommended practice and was not
mandatory, but prudent operators complied with manufacturers' service bulletins as
closely as practicable. Using all magneto data with values up to 600 service hours
as the upper limit for inclusion in the analysis model, produced the results shown in
Table 4.2.
Piper Arrow Data. The four Piper Arrow airplanes were removed
permanently from the FITA fleet in early 2018. Because the small sample set of
Piper Arrow magneto failures consisted of only 11 left and 11 right magneto
failures within the 10.25 years of maintenance records, the Arrow data was only
included in the original raw data set. See Tables 4.1 and 4.2 for the portion of the
sample related to the Piper Arrow type, n = 11 for each L and R magneto, where it
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was included in the overall fleet analysis for robust initial sample size. However,
because the Arrows had been removed from the fleet, the researcher excluded the
Arrow data from the data set for all further analysis on the grounds that it would be
irrelevant to future decisions and actions affecting the remaining fleet.
Magneto Expected Service Life. To provide some background for the
decision to use 600 hours as an upper limit of expected service life, the raw data set
was initially explored by reducing the upper limit of time in-service to 1000 hours,
and then to 800 hours and examining the results. Running the model with those
limits continued to have results skewed by the number of higher hour values in the
2007 to 2010 data. The results were not included in this paper because they were
irrelevant based on the decision to have the upper limit set at 600 in-service hours
for the reasons explained in this chapter. The preliminary analysis of data was
intended to explore for a usable benchmark for a normally expected service life.
During that exploration, the researcher decided that the Slick magneto service
bulletin (SB) recommending periodic external inspections each 100 hours of
service and an internal maintenance inspection and overhaul service each 500 hours
of magneto service should be the baseline used for excluding the high values from
the data set for further analysis.

70

Table 4.2.
Characteristics of FITA Fleet Magnetos Replaced in their Expected Service Life a
Aircraft Type
Group

Multiengi
ne Fleet

Single-Engine Fleet
PA28-161
Warrior
Aspen

PA28-161
Warrior PA28-181 PA28-201
Archer
Arrow
Avidyne

Total
Single
Engine
Fleet

PA44
Seminole
Multiengine

Total
Fleet

Number of Magneto Failures or Replacements at or before 600 service hours
Left
Magneto

46

50

41

11

148

40

188

Right
Magneto

34

39

35

11

119

33

152

Total

80

89

76

22

267

73

340

Total Service Hours on Magnetos at Failure or Replacement
Left
Magneto

15,534

15,776

14,233

2878

48,421

13,276

61,697

Right
Magneto

12,101

12,243

12,581

3,033

39,958

11,588

51,546

Total

27,635

28,019

26,814

5,911

88.379

24,864

113,243

Mean Operating Time to Magneto Failure or Replacement, hours
Left
Magneto

337.7

315.5

298.6

261.6

327.2

331.9

328.2

Right
Magneto

355.9

313.9

359.5

275.7

335.8

351.2

339.1

345.4

314.8

326.6

268.7

331.0

340.6

333.1

Combined

Note. Includes 60 magnetos removed at time of engine overhaul
a

Useful life is operationally defined as operating to 600 service hours.

The FITA maintenance department was expected to perform the service
recommended in the SB by replacing the rotor, points, coil, condenser and,
occasionally, the nylon timing gear and distributor cap each 500 hours. During each
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of FITA's 50-hours service and its 100 hours inspection cycles, the magneto timing,
ignition harness wires, and spark plugs were inspected externally and maintained as
necessary by the mechanics.
As previously described, FITA ceased performing in-house SB maintenance
and overhaul of the magnetos and commenced sending them for full overhaul at a
specialist company (QAA) when they had recorded time in-service between 450 to
600 hours. This was chosen as a cost saving measure following numerous early
failures because the overhaul company guaranteed the overhauled magnetos and
would replace a magneto with another overhauled unit if a failure occurred during
the warranty period. FITA certainly had valid financial reasons for choosing this
option; however, the cost saving measure did not mitigate the risk of early failure.
The new practice reduced some aircraft downtime because simply replacing a
magneto with a contractor overhauled unit instead of completing an in-house
overhaul was faster. The cost of early magneto failures was partially offset for
FITA due to the overhauled magnetos having a one-year warranty period. Most
early failures occurred within the first year of service before 450 service hours had
elapsed and were still within the warranty validity period.
Exactly when the FITA mechanics performed the SB maintenance prior to
2012 could not be accurately identified from the records; therefore, no count could
be made of the number of overhauls performed by the FITA mechanics within the
first five years of raw data. The researcher believed that may have obscured the
frequency of the overhauls prior to 2012 although no clear record of numerous
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early failures existed such as those that became obvious after 2011. The researcher
decided that placing the upper limit for failure and replacement times in the entire
model at 600 hours and only using data from the raw dataset that met that limitation
would be reasonable, thereby excluding any events over 600 hours. The extra 100
hours over the 500 hours was added because the SB was not mandatory in nature,
and an extra 20% level of flexibility to 600 hours was considered as a reasonable
upper limit for the model. Adding the additional hours reflected the realities of
maintenance practices of scheduling the magneto changes predicated on the SB 500
hour service interval to coincide with a service at 50 or 100 - hour inspection
intervals, affording more flexibility to the maintenance scheduling task and
improving fleet availability for operations. The FITA maintenance team noted that
the practice contributed to more effective use of maintenance resources,
particularly for service or inspection events in cases where no airplane ignition
system operational fault had been reported (R. Kern, personal communications,
September, various dates, 2016).
Based on the FITA policy to send magnetos for overhaul at 500 hours, all
magneto failures or replacements in the data set that had been recorded as having
been accomplished between 450 hours and up to 600 hours were treated as normal
life cycle overhaul replacements and were not scored as failures. Notably, some of
the high time (over 600 hours in service) replacements may have been overhauled
by FITA during routine inspection cycles, but any such overhauls could not be
determined from the aircraft maintenance logs. All magneto replacement values
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below 450 hours were then operationally defined as early failures because they fell
outside the 450 to 600 hour expected service life.
The raw data set was modified by excluding all values above 600 hours,
excluding all magneto changes due to engine replacements, and Piper Arrow
magnetos. The modified data set was then modelled using the Reliability and
Survival Life Distribution model JMP14™. The graphical results are shown in
Figure 4.1.
Time to Replacement by Aircraft Type. In order to examine the
differences in mean times between failures (MTBF) between aircraft types, the
under 600 hours in service data set was broken up and classified so it could be
examined by aircraft type.
Aircraft-Type Sample Sets. Ideally, the sample sizes for each aircraft type
would be equal; however, several were larger, with two being only 1 or 2 units of
analysis data points smaller. Because the resulting sample data was unequal in
sample sizes for two aircraft types, a minimum sample size of n = 35 was chosen
from the samples used to create Table 4.2, except for the Piper Arrow data, which
was excluded from the analysis.
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Figure 4.1
Cumulative Probability of FITA Fleet Magneto Replacement at or Before the End
of Magneto’s Useful Service Life a and with Fitted Distribution Model

Note. Depicts Sample Set of magnetos that were replaced between 2007 and 2017 with less than
600 service hours. Excludes PA28-201 Arrow data as FITA removed the aircraft from the fleet.
Excludes 60 magnetos removed at time of engine overhaul n = 319, M = 345.25, SD = 160.8.
Depicts comparison of the nonparametric data to Weibull, Normal, and Logistic Distribution curves
at the 95% confidence interval.

In order to equalize the samples from the four aircraft types, the researcher
used JMP14™ software to randomize and reduce the larger samples, n = 46, 50, 39,
41, and 40, each to n = 35. Smaller samples n = 33 and n = 34 were each increased
to n = 35 by substitution of the respective sample means. (Matching larger samples
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to smaller samples and equalization of smaller sample sizes to larger by using
randomization and substitution of the means for missing data points is a recognized
and acceptable statistical technique (M. Gallo, personal communication, February
20, 2019)).
The randomized, sample-data distributions were examined for each aircraft
type and for the left and right magneto against the normal, logistic and Weibull
distributions by using the same Reliability and Survival Life Distribution model.
The researcher examined each of the eight n = 35 sample sets using the same three
models of cumulative probability distribution analysis. The results were recorded
and described in figures and tables, starting with the Aspen left and right magnetos,
followed by the Avidyne, Archer, and Seminole.
When the distributions were examined, the plots clearly indicated that the
data was a near fit in the logistic and normal distribution patterns. The researcher
examined each of the eight n = 35 sample sets using the same three models of
cumulative probability distribution analysis for the left and the right magnetos on
each of the four aircraft types. The results were recorded and described in figures
and tables, starting with the Aspen's left and right magnetos, followed by the
followed by the Avidyne's, Archer's, and Seminole's.
PA-28-161 Aspen, Left Magneto. Figure 4.2 clearly indicates that most left
magnetos fitted to the PA-28-161 Aspen aircraft engines did not last until the 500hour overhaul recommended in the Slick SB. Only 14 of 35 magnetos in the sample
were replaced at above 450 hours, all 14 were considered to have lasted until the
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500-hour overhaul target. In other words, they were not actual failures but were
timed-out for replacements. The remaining 21 magnetos failed earlier than 450
hours, equating to roughly a 60% early failure rate in the sample. Nevertheless,
from 2007 to 2010, the maintenance records indicated that many magnetos lasted
above the 600-hour cut off limit used for this sample, and the high failure rate did
not reflect a constant 10.25-year failure rate. Most failures below 450 hours
occurred during the last six years of the study period, and the early failures
happened so frequently they prompted the serious concerns that resulted in this
study.
The plot in Figure 4.2 indicates that the pattern of failures more nearly fit
the normal and logistic distributions. Some clustering of data points around the 50and 100-hour interval values may indicate that problems were discovered during
the routine, periodic 50- and 100-hour maintenance checks.
Based on the records, at least 11 left magnetos failed in service, with most
failures having been first detected by pilots when conducting standard operating
procedure engine checks before take-off. A few magneto failures were logged by
maintenance personnel as having been the cause of ignition system malfunctions
that had been reported as in-flight problems by pilots. The raw data search revealed
that most in-flight ignition system malfunctions reported by pilots had resulted
from fouled or unserviceable spark plugs, which is discussed later in this chapter.
Which distribution model would best be used for exploration of the data
was the question that prompted the researcher to examine the sample distribution
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using the JMP14™ Reliability and Survival Life Distribution analysis to discover a
distribution that would capture all data points within the lower and upper 95%
confidence intervals (CI) on the plot. Figure 4.2 illustrates the capture of data
points within the CI. The estimate of goodness of fit in each model and the
parameter estimations from that analysis are further shown in Table 4.3 and
discussed following the table.
Table 4.3 shows the results of testing the three distribution models of the
Aspen left magneto failures and replacements using the JMP14™ derived Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to provide
estimates of the relative quality of the statistical model of the small sample. The
BIC provided effectively the same kind of estimate as the AIC criterion, and the
lowest value of these two measures was expected to indicate which was a better
model. The two criteria were consistent. The other criterion, the -2 Loglikelihood,
was consistent with the other two criteria for a normally distributed dataset, and
indicated the data had a near normal distribution and could be analyzed in a leastsquares regression model for analysis of variance. The researcher recognized that
small sample size was a concern; however, it included all the data available for this
single case study.
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Figure 4.2.
Cumulative Probability of PA-28-161 Aspen Left-Magneto Replacements at or
Before the End of Magneto’s Useful Service Life a and with Fitted Distribution
Models b

Note. n = 35 M = 356.4, Median = 403, SD = 145.71. Sample Set depicted is a randomly-selected
subset of data for specific aircraft type and magneto location on engine.
a

Useful life is operationally defined as operating to 600 service hours.

b

Depicts fit of

nonparametric data to Weibull, Normal, and Logistic Distribution curves at the 95% confidence
interval.

This was an exploratory single-case study not intended to provide results
generalizable for all Aspen PA-28-161 aircraft. The same type of analysis was then
performed on the sample data for the Aspen right-magneto replacements.
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Table 4.3
Comparisons of Fit Indices in Models Fitted to Aspen Left-Magneto Data a b
95% Confidence Interval
Model

AICc

-2Loglikelihood

BIC

Mean

Normal

451.40

447.02

454.13

356.49

Logistic

452.46

448.08

455.19

Weibull

458.91

454.53

461.64

SE

LL

UL

24.27

308.91

404.07

370.69

24.73

322.21

419.17

349.48

24.79

304.11

401.62

Note: AICc =Akaike information criterion, corrected; BIC = Bayesian information
criterion; SE = Standard error; LL =lower limit; UL = upper limit
a.

Data include magnetos removed at or before the end of their useful life (600 hours) due

to failure or end-of-life replacement. Excludes removals due to engine replacement.
b

Sample tested was randomized sample (n=35) from Aspen Left-Magneto data. Relates to

Figure 4.2.

PA-28-161 Aspen, Right Magneto. Figure 4.3 indicates that most right
magnetos fitted to the Aspen PA-28-161 aircraft engines did not remain in service
until their 500-hour overhaul. Only 16 of 35 right magnetos were replaced above
450 hours. In other words, they were not failures but were timed-out replacements.
The remaining 19 magnetos failed earlier than 450 hours, indicating a 54% early
failure rate in the sample. Similar to the left magnetos, many magnetos in the
original raw data set appeared to have lasted well beyond the 600-hour cut off limit
for this sample. The longer hours of service appeared to have occurred during the

80

early years of the sample period before the higher failure rate following 2010 was
evident.
The plot in Figure 4.3 indicated that the normal and logistic distributions of
the replacement pattern showed the best fit, and the clustering of data points around
the recurring 50- and 100-hour interval values indicated that many of the failures
were detected during routine periodic 50- and 100-hour maintenance checks.
At least nine Aspen right magnetos failed in service, with most failures
detected during the before-takeoff engine checks by pilots and a few magneto
failures were found by maintenance after in-flight ignition system malfunctions
were reported by pilots.
The distribution models in Figure 4.3 answer the question regarding the best
sample distribution to be used during additional exploration of the data and were
completed using the JMP14™ Reliability and Survival Life Distributions Analysis
option. The data was run to capture the most data points within the lower and upper
95% CI curves as shown in Figure 4.3. Table 4.4 includes the results from running
the sample of Aspen right magneto failures in three distribution models using the
JMP14™ derived AIC and BIC criteria to provide an estimate of the relative
quality of each statistical model for analysis of the small sample. The BIC and AIC
were very closer, indicating equally good models. The third criterion, the 2Loglikelihood, was consistent with the other two criteria, indicating the data had a
near normal distribution that could be analysed in a regression model.
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Figure 4.3
Cumulative Probability of PA-28-161 Aspen Right-Magneto Failures or
Replacements at or Before the End of Magneto’s Useful Service Life a and with
Fitted Distribution Models b

Note. n = 35 M = 355.9, SD = 154.7. Median = 402.6, SE = 26.15.
Sample Set depicted is a randomly-selected subset of data for specific aircraft type and magneto
location on engine.
a

Useful life is operationally defined as operating to 600 service hours.

b

Depicts fit of

nonparametric data to Weibull, Normal, and Logistic Distribution curves at the 95% confidence
interval.

82

Though a concern, the small sample included all the data available in this
case. This was an exploratory single-case study not intended to generalize any
results to a population consisting of all Aspen PA-28-161 aircraft. The same type of
analysis was then performed on the Avidyne left magneto failures data.

Table 4.4
Comparison of Fit Indices in Models Fitted to Aspen Right-Magneto Data a b
95% Confidence Interval
Model

AICc -2Loglikelihood

BIC

Mean

SE

LL

UL

Normal

455.59

451.22

458.32

355.91

25.77

305.40

406.43

Logistic

458.08

453.71

460.82

368.10

27.55

314.11

422.10

Weibull

462.69

458.32

465.43

348.78

26.90

299.85

405.70

Note: AICc =Akaike information criterion, corrected; BIC = Bayesian information criterion;
SE = Standard error; LL =lower limit; UL = upper limit
a.

Data include magnetos replaced at or before the end of their useful life (600 hours) due to failure

or end-of-life replacement. Excludes removals due to engine replacement.
b

Sample tested was randomized sample (n=35) from Aspen Right-Magneto data. Relates to Figure

4.3

PA-28-161 Avidyne, Left Magneto. Figure 4.4 indicates that most left
magnetos fitted to the Avidyne PA-28-161 aircraft engines did not remain in
service until a 500-hour overhaul. Only 11 out of 35 magnetos were replaced above
450 hours; in other words, they were not failures but were timed-out replacements.
The remaining 24 magnetos failed earlier than 450 hours, indicating a 68% early
failure rate in the sample. As previously mentioned, many magnetos lasted well
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above the 600 hours of service cut off limit in the original, much larger, raw data
sample during the early years of the study period, and reasons have been explained.
The plot in Figure 4.4 indicates normal and logistic distributions best model
the replacement pattern and the clustering of data points at the recurring 50- and
100-hour intervals indicated that approximately six of the failures were detected
during routine periodic 50- and 100-hour maintenance checks of the magnetos. At
least 17 magnetos failed in-service outside the routine periodic maintenance
checks. Most of those 17 failures were detected by pilots during before take-off
engine checks, and the remainder were diagnosed by maintenance after in-flight
ignition system malfunctions were reported by pilots.
The researcher then wondered how to identify which of the distribution
models would be best to use for further analysis of the sample of Avidyne left
magneto failure data. The question was answered by the examination of the sample
distribution using the JMP14™ Reliability and Survival Life Distribution analysis
to find the distribution that would best capture all data points within the lower and
upper 95% CI curves as illustrated in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4
Cumulative Probability of PA28-161 Avidyne Left-Magneto Failures or
Replacements at or Before the End of Magneto’s Useful Service Life a and with
Fitted Distribution Models b

Note: n = 35, Median = 283.6, M = 307.03, SD = 165.91
Sample Set depicted is a randomly-selected subset of data for specific aircraft type and magneto
location on engine.
a

Useful life is operationally defined as operating to 600 service hours.

b

Depicts fit of

nonparametric data to Weibull, Normal, and Logistic Distribution curves at the 95% confidence
interval.
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The estimate of goodness of fit for each model and the parameter
estimations from that analysis are listed in Table 4.5, which indicates the results
from testing the three distribution models of the Avidyne Left magneto failures
using the JMP14™ derived AIC and BIC criteria to provide an estimate of the
relative quality of the statistical model for the small sample. The AIC and BIC
scores were consistent. The -2Loglikelihood, indicated the data had a near normal
distribution that could be analyzed in a least-squares regression model. The same
type of analysis was then performed on the sample data for the Avidyne right
magneto failures.

Table 4.5
Comparison of Fit Indices in Models Fitted to Avidyne Left-Magneto Data a b
95% Confidence Interval
Model

AICc

-2Loglikelihood

Normal

460.49

456.11

Weibull

462.56

Logistic

463.51

BIC

Mean

SE

LL

UL

463.22 307.03

27.64

252.86

361.21

458.19

465.30 302.94

29.32

250.61

366.21

459.13

466.24 310.58

29.99

251.79

369.37

Note: AICc =Akaike information criterion, corrected; BIC = Bayesian information criterion;
SE = Standard error; LL =lower limit; UL = upper limit
a.

Data include magnetos removed at or before the end of their useful life (600 hours) due to failure

or end-of-life replacement. Excludes removals due to engine replacement.
b

Sample tested was randomized sample (n=35) from Avidyne Left-Magneto data. Relates to Figure

4.4.
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PA-28-161 Avidyne, Right Magneto. The data plot in Figure 4.5 clearly
indicates that most of the right magnetos fitted to the Avidyne PA-28-161 aircraft
engines failed before their 500-hour overhaul. Only 13 of the 35 magnetos in the
sample were replaced above 450 hours. All 13 of them were considered to have
lasted until the 500-hour overhaul target and were timed-out replacements. The
remaining 22 magnetos each failed earlier than 450 hours, indicating a 62.8% early
failure rate in this sample. Nevertheless, in the raw data during the early years of
the sample period many magnetos had been recorded as lasting well beyond the
600-hour upper cut offcut off limit. The high failure rate was not exemplary of the
entire 10.25-year failure rate. Most failures before 450 hours were recorded during
the last six years of the study period, and the rate on the Avidyne was high enough
to include it in the serious concerns that prompted this study. The plot in Figure 4.5
reveals that the normal and logistical distributions best shows the replacement
pattern. Some failures were detected during routine periodic 50- or 100-hour
maintenance checks. At least 8 magnetos failed in service, with most failures
detected during the pilots' before-take-off engine checks and a few more found by
maintenance as a cause factor of pilot reported in-flight ignition system
malfunctions.
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Figure 4.5
Cumulative Probability of PA-28-161 Avidyne Right-Magneto Failures or
Replacements at or Before the End of Magneto’s Useful Service Life a and with
Fitted Distribution Models b

Note: n = 35, Median = 364.2 M = 331.9. Sample Set depicted is a randomly-selected subset of data
for specific aircraft type and magneto location on engine.
a

Useful life is operationally defined as operating to 600 service hours.

b

Depicts fit of

nonparametric data to Weibull, Normal, and Logistic Distribution curves at the 95% confidence
interval.

Which distribution model would best facilitate additional exploration of the
Avidyne right-magneto failure data? That question prompted the analysis of the
sample using JMP14™ Reliability and Survival Life Distribution model to find a
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distribution that captured all data points within the lower and upper 95% CI curves
as shown in Figure 4.5. Table 4.6 shows the estimate of goodness of fit in each
model, the parameter estimates, and the results from testing the three distribution
models for the Avidyne right magneto failures using the JMP14™ derived AIC and
BIC to provide an estimate of the relative quality of the statistical model using the
small sample. BIC estimates agreed closely with the AIC estimates, and the lowest
value of these two measures estimated which quality model is best. The two criteria
were consistent, and the -2Loglikelihood was consistent with the other two criteria
for a near normally distributed data set. The data had a near normal distribution and
could be analyzed for variance using a least-squares regression model. The small
sample size was a concern, but limited data was available in this case.
This exploratory case study could not generalize results to the total
population of Avidyne-equipped PA-28-161 aircraft. The same type of analysis was
performed using the data sample related to the Archer PA-28-181 left-magneto
replacements.
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Table 4.6
Comparison of Fit Indices in Models Fitted to Avidyne Right-Magneto Data a b
95% Confidence Interval
Model

AICc -2Loglikelihood

BIC

Mean

SE

LL

UL

Normal
Weibull

463.49
464.17

459.12
459.80

466.23
466.91

330.99
328.57

28.85
29.48

274.44
275.59

387.54
391.74

Logistic

466.59

462.22

469.33

337.05

31.36

275.58

398.51

Note: AICc =Akaike information criterion, corrected; BIC = Bayesian information criterion;
SE = Standard error; LL =lower limit; UL = upper limit.
a.

Data include magnetos removed at or before the end of their useful life (600 hours) due to failure

or end-of-life replacement. Excludes removals due to engine replacement.
b

Sample tested was randomized sample (n=35) from Avidyne Right-Magneto data. Relates to

Figure 4.5.

PA-28-181 Archer, Left Magneto. The data plot in Figure 4.6 clearly shows
that most of the left magnetos fitted to the Archer PA-28-181 aircraft engines did
not remain in service up to the recommended 500-hour overhaul. Only 15 out of 35
magnetos were replaced above 450 hours, and all 15 were considered to have lasted
till the 500-hour overhaul target. In other words, they were not actual failures but
were timed-out replacements. The remaining 20 magnetos failed before 450 hours,
indicating a 60% early failure rate in the sample. In the early years of the study
period many magnetos in the raw data sample lasted well above the 600-hour cut
off, indicating a high failure rate was probably not exemplary over the entire study
period. Most early failures below 450 hours occurred frequently enough during the
last 6 years of the study period to ignite the serious concerns that prompted this

90

study. The plot in Figure 4.6 reveals that the normal and logistic distributions best
indicated the replacement pattern and some clustering of data points around the 50and 100-hour interval values may indicate that many of the failures were detected
during routine periodic 50- and 100-hour maintenance checks. At least 11
magnetos failed in service, with most failures detected by pilots during beforetakeoff engine checks. An additional 9 magneto failures were found by
maintenance to have been the cause of in-flight ignition system malfunctions
reported by pilots.
The JMP14™ Reliability and Survival Life Distribution model was used to
estimate which distribution would capture all data points within the lower and upper
95% CI curves. The plot in Figure 4.6 illustrates the capture of data points within the
CIs. The estimate of goodness of fit for each distribution and the parameter
estimations from that analysis are shown in Table 4.7, which indicates the results
from testing the three distribution models of the Archer left magneto failures using
the JMP14™ derived AIC and BIC to provide an estimate of the relative quality of
the statistical model of the small sample. The BIC was very close to the AIC. The
lowest values of these two measures estimated which was the better model. The two
criteria were consistent and the other criterion, the -2 Loglikelihood was also
consistent and indicated the sample data had a near normal distribution and could be
studied further using a least-squares regression model. The small sample size could
was a concern but was all the data available in this case.
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Figure 4.6
Cumulative Probability of PA28-181 Archer Left Magneto Failures or
Replacements at or Before the End of Magneto’s Useful Service Life a and with
Fitted Distribution Models b

Note: n = 35, Median = 432.2, M = 360.5, SD = 146.79, SE = 24.1. Sample Set depicted is a
randomly-selected subset of data for specific aircraft type and magneto location on engine.
a

Useful life is operationally defined as operating to 600 service hours.

b

Depicts fit of

nonparametric data to Weibull, Normal, and Logistic Distribution curves at the 95% confidence
interval.

This exploratory single-case study was not intended to generalize results to
all other Piper Archer PA-28-181 aircraft. The same type of analysis was then
performed for the Archer right magneto failures.
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Table 4.7
Comparison of Fit Indices in Models Fitted to Archer Left-Magneto Data a b
95% Confidence Interval
Model

AICc -2Loglikelihood

BIC

Mean

SE

LL

UL

Weibull

451.48

447.10

454.21

360.74

23.57

317.37

410.03

Normal

451.92

447.54

454.65

360.48

24.45

312.55

408.41

Logistic

455.07

450.69

457.80

367.44

26.76

314.98

419.89

Note: AICc =Akaike information criterion, corrected; BIC = Bayesian information criterion;
SE = Standard error; LL =lower limit; UL = upper limit.
a.

Data include magnetos removed at or before the end of their useful life (600 hours) due to failure

or end-of-life replacement. Excludes removals due to engine replacement.
b

Sample tested was randomized sample (n=35) from Archer Left-Magneto data. Relates to Figure

4.6.

PA-28-181 Archer, Right Magneto. The data plot in Figure 4.7 clearly
shows that most of the right magnetos fitted to the Archer PA-28-181 aircraft
engines failed to last till their 500-hour overhaul. Only 15 of 35 magnetos were
replaced above 450 hours, and all 15 were considered to have lasted to the 500hour overhaul target. In other words, they were not failures but were timed-out
replacements. The remaining 20 magnetos failed earlier than 450 hours, and the
data indicated a 57% early failure rate in this sample. Nevertheless, in the original
raw data set many magnetos lasted well above the 600 hour cut off during the years
before 2011, so such a high failure rate was probably not exemplary, although most
failures below 450 hours had occurred during the last six years of the study period
with a failure rate high enough to raise the alarms that prompted this study.
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The plot in Figure 4.7 reveals that the normal and logistic distributions best
indicated the replacement pattern and the clustering of data points around the 50- or
100-hour interval values and indicated that eight of the early failures were detected
during routine periodic 50- and 100-hour maintenance checks. At least 12
magnetos failed in service, with most failures detected during before-takeoff engine
checks by pilots with a few found by maintenance as the cause of in-flight ignition
system malfunctions reported by pilots.
The JMP14™ Reliability and Survival Life Distribution model was used to
look for a distribution that captured all data points within the lower and upper 95%
CI curves. The plot in Figure 4.7 illustrates the capture of data points within the
CIs. The estimate of goodness of fit in each model and the parameter estimations
from that analysis are shown in Table 4.8, which indicates the results from testing
the three distribution models for the Archer right magneto failures using the
JMP14™ derived AIC and BIC to provide an estimation of the relative quality of
the statistical model for the small sample. The BIC values agree closely with the
AIC values for all three distributions. The lower value of those two criteria
estimated the better quality of model. The third criterion, the -2Loglikelihood
estimate, was consistent with the other two criteria for a normally distributed data
set and indicated the data had a near normal distribution and could be analyzed
using least squares regression. The small sample size was a concern but was all the
data available in this case. This was an exploratory single-case study with results
unlikely to generalize to all other Archer PA-28-181 aircraft. The same type of
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analysis was then performed for the Seminole PA-44-180 left and right magneto
failures.
PA-44-180 Seminole, Left Magneto. The data plot in Figure 4.8 clearly
shows that most left magnetos fitted to the Seminole PA-44-180 aircraft engines
failed to last until the 500-hour overhaul.
Only 16 of 35 magnetos were replaced above 450 hours, having timed-out
and were considered to have lasted till the 500-hour overhaul target and were not
early failures, rather they were timed out replacements. The remaining 19 magnetos
failed before reaching 450 hours of service indicating a 54% early failure rate had
occurred within the sample. Nevertheless, many magnetos went well above the
chosen 600 hours cut off as seen in the original raw data sample during the early
years of the study period. The high failure rate was only seen during the latter six
years of the study period. As noted, the number of early failures from 2011 onward
was sufficiently high to fuel the concerns that led to this study.
The plot in Figure 4.8 indicates that the normal and logistic distributions
best modelled the replacement pattern. The clustering of data points around the 50and 100-hour interval values indicates that many of the failures were detected
during routine, periodic, 50- and 100-hour maintenance checks. At least 11
magnetos failed in service, with most failures detected by pilots during beforetakeoff engine checks by pilots and the remainder by maintenance after in-flight
ignition system malfunctions were reported by pilots.
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Figure 4.7
Cumulative Probability of PA28-181 Archer Right-Magneto Failures or
Replacements at or Before the End of Magneto’s Useful Service Life a and with
Fitted Distribution Models b

Note: n = 35, Median = 417.4, M = 359.46, SD = 142.48, SE = 24.08. Sample Set depicted is a
randomly-selected subset of data for specific aircraft type and magneto location on engine.
a

Useful life is operationally defined as operating to 600 service hours.

b

Depicts fit of

nonparametric data to Weibull, Normal, and Logistic Distribution curves at the 95% confidence
interval.
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Table 4.8
Comparison of Fit Indices in Models Fitted to Archer Right-Magneto Data a b
95% Confidence Interval
Model

AICc -2Loglikelihood

BIC

Mean

SE

LL

UL

Normal

449.83

445.46

452.57

359.46

23.74

312.93

405.98

Logistic

451.27

446.89

454.01

374.69

24.51

326.64

422.73

Weibull

453.59

449.21

456.32

355.95

23.03

313.57

404.07

Note: AICc =Akaike information criterion, corrected; BIC = Bayesian information criterion;
SE = Standard error; LL =lower limit; UL = upper limit
a.

Data include magnetos removed at or before the end of their useful life (600 hours) due to failure

or end-of-life replacement. Excludes removals due to engine replacement.
b

Sample tested was randomized sample (n=35) from Archer Right-Magneto data. Relates to Figure
4.7.
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Figure 4.8
Cumulative Probability of PA44 Seminole Left-Magneto Failures or Replacements
at or Before the End of Magneto’s Useful Service Life a and with Fitted
Distribution Models b

Note: n = 35, Median = 391.8, M = 323.48, SD = 170.03, SE = 28.74. Sample Set depicted is a
randomly-selected subset of data for specific aircraft type and magneto location on engine.
a

Useful life is operationally defined as operating to 600 service hours.

b

Depicts fit of

nonparametric data to Weibull, Normal, and Logistic Distribution curves at the 95% confidence
interval.

Which distribution model would allow additional exploration of the data?
That was the question that prompted the examination of the sample distribution
within the JMP14™ Reliability and Survival Life Distribution model to find a
distribution that would capture all data points within the lower and upper 95%
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confidence interval. The plot in Figure 4.8 illustrates the capture of data points
within the CIs. The estimate of goodness of fit in each model and the parameter
estimations from the analysis are shown in Table 4.9, which indicates the results
from testing the three distribution models for the Seminole left magneto failures
using the JMP14™ derived AIC and BIC to provide an estimate of the relative
quality of the statistical model for the small sample. The BIC value was very close
to the AIC value. The lowest values of the two measures indicates the best model.
The third criterion, the -2Loglikelihood, was consistent with the other two criteria
for a normally distributed data set, and indicated the data had a near normal
distribution that could be analysed in a least-squares regression model. The small
sample size was a concern, but all available data was included in this case.
This exploratory single-case study was not likely to generalize any results to
all other Seminole PA-44-180 aircraft. The same type of analysis was completed
for the Seminole right magneto failures.
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Table 4.9
Comparison of Fit Indices in Models Fitted to Seminole Left-Magneto Data a b
95% Confidence Interval
Model

AICc -2Loglikelihood

BIC

Mean

SE

LL

UL

Normal

462.21

457.83

464.94

323.49

28.33

267.97

379.01

Logistic

465.33

460.96

468.07

335.05

30.97

274.36

395.75

Weibull

473.96

469.59

476.70

312.52

36.85

248.03

393.77

Note: AICc =Akaike information criterion, corrected; BIC = Bayesian information criterion;
SE = Standard error; LL =lower limit; UL = upper limit
a.

Data include magnetos removed at or before the end of their useful life (600 hours) due to failure

or end-of-life replacement. Excludes removals due to engine replacement.
b

Sample tested was randomized sample (n=35) from Seminole Left-Magneto data. Relates to

Figure 4.8

PA-44-180 Seminole, Right Magneto. The data plot in Figure 4.9 clearly
indicates that many of the right magnetos fitted to the Seminole PA-44-180 aircraft
engines did not last until their 500-hour overhaul period. Only 18 of 35 magnetos
were replaced above 450 hours and were considered to have lasted to the 500-hour
overhaul target, in other words, they were not actual failures but were timed-out
replacements. The remaining 17 magnetos failed earlier than 450 hours, equating to
a 48% early failure rate in this sample. Nevertheless, many magnetos in the original
unmodified raw data sample lasted well beyond the 600-hours service during the
early years of the sample period. Most early failures under 450 hours occurred
during the last six years of the study period, and the failure frequency was high
enough to raise the serious concerns which prompted this study.
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The plot in Figure 4.9 indicates that the normal and logistic distributions
had the best fit for the sample data. The replacement pattern showed clusters of
data points around the 50- and 100-hour interval values, indicating that nine of the
early failures were detected during routine periodic 50- or 100-hour maintenance
checks. Another eight magnetos failed in service, with most failures detected
during before-takeoff engine checks by pilots and others found by maintenance as
the cause of in-flight ignition system malfunctions reported by pilots.
An examination of the sample distribution using JMP14™ Reliability and
Survival Life Distribution model was completed to seek out the distribution that
best captured all data points within the lower and upper 95% CI curves. The plot in
Figure 4.9 illustrates the capture of data points within the CIs. The estimate of
goodness of fit in each distribution and the parameter estimations from that analysis
are shown in Table 4.10, which indicates the results of testing the three distribution
models for the Seminole right magneto failures using the JMP14™ derived AIC
and BIC criteria to provide an estimate of the relative quality of the statistical
model of the small sample.
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Figure 4.9
Cumulative Probability of PA44 Seminole Right-Magneto Failures or
Replacements at or Before the End of Magneto’s Useful Service Life a and with
Fitted Distribution Models b

Note: n = 35, Median = 438.6, M = 351.16, SD = 157.43, SE = 25.61. Sample Set depicted is a
randomly-selected subset of data for specific aircraft type and magneto location on engine.
a

Useful life is operationally defined as operating to 600 service hours.

b

Depicts fit of

nonparametric data to Weibull, Normal, and Logistic Distribution curves at the 95% confidence
interval.

The BIC and AIC values were close for the normal and logistic models, and
the lower value of these two measures indicated which might be the superior
quality model. The other criterion, the -2Loglikelihood, indicated the sample data
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had a near normal distribution and could be analyzed using a least squares
regression model. The small sample size was a concern, as it was for every one of
the other samples of size n = 35 in these analyses, but limited data was available in
this case. This exploratory single-case study had no expectation of generalization of
sample results to all other Seminole magnetos.
Table 4.10
Comparison of Fit Indices in Models Fitted to Seminole Right-Magneto Data a b
95% Confidence Interval
Model

AICc -2Loglikelihood

BIC

Mean

SE

Normal

456.82

Logistic
Weibull

LL

UL

452.44

459.55

351.16

26.23

299.75

402.57

457.79

453.42

460.53

374.99

26.47

323.11

426.88

476.69

472.32

479.42

334.97

35.08

272.81

411.28

Note: AICc =Akaike information criterion, corrected; BIC = Bayesian information criterion;
SE = Standard error; LL =lower limit; UL = upper limit
a.

Data include magnetos removed at or before the end of their useful life (600 hours) due to failure

or end-of-life replacement. Excludes removals due to engine replacement.
b

Sample tested was randomized sample (n=35) from Seminole Right-Magneto data. Relates to

Figure 4.9.

Magneto Replacements by Year. Each of the foregoing analyses of the
magneto failures in each type of airplane in the FITA fleet indicated that the
distribution of higher times between failures appeared during the early years of the
study and that from 2011 onward to 2017, the frequency of early failures increased
with a peak occurring in 2014. Figure 4.10 displays the distribution of all early
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failures fitting the researcher-selected criterion of failure or replacement before 600
hours during each year of the study period.
Figure 4.10 displays the frequency of recorded magneto failures or
replacements before 600 hours of service during each year from 2007 to first
quarter 2017. Of the N = 518 magnetos in the original, unmodified raw data, 60
were excluded because they were due to engine changes, some were excluded due
to being over 600 in service hours when they were replaced, and n = 341 were
recorded as being replaced before 600 hours of service with most of the early
failures happening in the last six years of the study period. Of note, magnetos that
were removed due to engine overhauls or failures were not included in the n = 341.
Twenty-two magneto failures from the Piper Archer were excluded from the n =
341 sample leaving n = 319 instances of magneto failures and replacements below
600 in-service hours.
The graph in Figure 4.10 illustrates that the frequency of early failures
increased in 2011 and more dramatically after 2012 and remained at a higher level
from 2011 to 2017 than in the years prior to 2011. Some unidentified factor must
have changed significantly to affect the rate of early failures. The flight training
profiles, associated airplane usage, operating environment, pilots' skill levels,
operating procedures, airplane engines, and fuel used by the engines had not
changed. In 2012, the decision was made to send the magnetos to a contractor for
overhaul when they reached between 450 and 600 hours within the maintenance
schedule flexibility. The decision was intended to comply with the Champion/Slick
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SB recommended 500-hour inspection and overhaul, and to reduce costs of early
failures of the magnetos by using the one-year replacement warranty offered by the
overhaul facility.

Figure 4.10
Frequency of Magneto Failures or Replacements for the Combined FITA Fleet a at
or Before the End of Magneto’s Useful Service Life b as a Function of Calendar
Year

Note: n = 341.
a

Combined FITA Fleet included 22 units of analysis for Piper Arrow.

b

Early Failures are operationally defined as magnetos replaced before 450 operating hours not due

to engine replacement. Useful life is operationally defined as 600 operating hours.
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A count was made of all magnetos that failed or were replaced before 600
hours and the results were grouped into two groups by each quarter of a year: the
groups were: (a) replacements before 450 hours (n = 178), and (b) failures between
451 and 600 hours (n = 141). Figures 4.11 shows the distribution of replacements
in the early failure group, shows that nine early failures occurred during the five
years preceding 2012, and 169 early failures occurred over the next five years.

Figure 4.11
Frequency of Magneto Early Failures a for Combined FITA Fleet b as a Function
of Calendar Quarters

Note: n = 178
a

Early Failures are operationally defined as magnetos replaced before 450 operating hours not due

to engine replacement. b Combined FITA Fleet does not include Piper Arrow data in this graph.
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Magneto Replacement Characteristics. Based on the data, the researcher
examined the characteristics of the magneto replacements.
Magnetos Removed for Overhaul. Sixty magnetos out of the 518 magneto
replacements in the entire raw data set had been removed at the time of the engine
removals over the 10.25-year period. Magnetos were not permitted to remain in
service after the engine to which they were fitted required replacement and
overhaul because the engine reached maximum life hours, internal parts of the
engine wore out in service, or the engine was replaced due to an engine-damage
event.
The reasons for the engine changes were neither tracked nor explained
because they were not relevant to this study. Because both magnetos were removed
when an engine was sent for overhaul an equal number of left and right magnetos
were removed. All magneto replacements based on engine removal for overhaul (n
= 60) were included in the raw data set (n = 518) and then were excluded from the
data set of all magnetos replaced with 600 or less in-service hours (n = 319 when
Piper Arrow data n = 22 was also excluded). All analyses of the data set of
magnetos replaced with 600 or less in-service hours and the data set of early
failures (n = 178) were done with the 60 magnetos removed at engine overhauls
excluded from the model, separating them from the data set of magnetos that failed
in service.
Magnetos Replaced by Aircraft Type. In Table 4.11, the means from each
of the eight groups are compared for the normal and logistic distributions: the
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means are shown together with the grand means of those samples. The means and
grand means of each aircraft type's left and right magneto time to failure or
replacement are shown from each n = 35 equal size sample set, the entire accessible
data set, and the entire n = 280 data set with all values above 600 hours excluded
are shown in Table 4.11. At the bottom of Table 4.11, the mean for the entire
fleet’s failures from the data set less than 600 hours (with all magneto removals due
to engine overhauls excluded) is shown. In fact, the mean times to failure for the set
of “Useful-Life Data” were within less than 2 percent of the grand means from the
eight sample sets of n = 35 in each sample.
Early Magneto Failures. The results in Table 4.11 led the researcher to
wonder what would have happened to the mean values if solely the early failures
were separated from the “Useful Life” data set. Early failure has been operationally
defined as any replacement before 450 hours of service because of the FITA
practice that allowed a routine magneto overhaul to be accomplished at a 450- to
600-hour interval. Therefore, the early failure data set was established to include
only magneto failures that occurred at less than 450 hours.
Analysis of Early Failures. The early-failures data were analyzed in the
same manner as all previous analyses and is shown in Figure 4.12 and Table 4.12.
The plot in Figure 4.12 indicates that the distribution of the data subset (including
all magneto failures below 450 hours, excluding all magneto changes made due to
engine failure, engine TBO or engine maintenance overhaul) fell mostly within the
95% CI of a near normal distribution.
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Table 4.11
Means and Standard Errors for Magneto Failures and Replacements for Different
Sample Sets
Airplane Type

Useful
Accessible
Life Data
Data Set c
b
Set

Equal Size Sample Sets a
Normal Model
M
SE

Logistic Model
M
SE

356.5
355.9

24.6
25.8

370.7
368.1

PA-28-161 Warrior Avidyne
Left Magneto
307.0
Right Magneto
331.0

27.6
28.8

PA-28-181 Archer
Left Magneto
Right Magneto

360.5
359.5

PA-44 Seminole Multiengine
Left Magneto
323.5
Right Magneto
351.2

PA-28-161 Warrior Aspen
Left Magneto
Right Magneto

M

M

24.7
27.5

337.7
355.9

616.3
696.8

310.6
337.0

30.0
31.4

315.5
313.9

589.2
595.7

24.4
23.7

367.4
374.7

26.8

24.5

347.1
359.5

422.9
546.3

28.3
26.2

335.0
375.0

31.0
26.5

331.1
351.2

577.1
560.5
560.9

Grand Means

343.2

-

354.8

-

339.0

Mean for of all mags
under 600 hours with all
engine overhauls
excluded

345.5

9.3

360.1

9.8

-

Note. Comparing Randomized-Equal Sized samples for Aircraft type-specific sample sets with the
Combined FITA Fleet within Useful Lie and Equal-Size at or Before the End of Magneto’s Useful
Life and Magneto Location
a

Equal-sample sets n=35 for each aircraft type and magneto location.

b

Useful-Life Data, N=341. Includes 22 magnetos replaced on Piper Arrows. Excludes removals

above 600 service hours.
c

Accessible Data N = 518. All magneto failures and replacements included.
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The researcher could not make inferences from the results because of the
small sample size and the lack of a random sample in this study. In order to
declutter the graph, the Weibull and logistic curves were not shown in Figure 4.13;
however, their parameter estimates are included in Table 4.12. As with the other
distributions depicted in the figures in this chapter, the sample data distribution
appeared to have the closest fit in the normal and logistic distributions. The
lowered mean time to failure in this analysis was due to the smaller sample that
excluded all replacements above 450 hours.
Figure 4.12 was considered by the researcher to display the best model for
the early failures because any magneto failures or replacements above 450 hours
were considered to have been removed and sent for overhaul due to time in-service
rather than failure in-service.
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Figure 4.12
Cumulative Probability of Early Magneto Failures a and with Fitted Normal
Distribution Model

Note: n = 178, Median = 254, M = 251.35, SD = 135.41, SE = 10.14.
a

Early failure is defined as any replacement before 450 in-service hours.

Table 4.12 shows the parametric estimates for the n = 178 early failures of
the magnetos. The 178 early failures were contained within the overall sample of
518 magneto failures or replacements over the 10.25 years of data. Most of the 178
early failures occurred within the last five years of the study period, 2012 to 2017,
raising the question of what may have changed in that time period to increase the
failures, and clearly demonstrating the reason this study was conceived in 2016 and
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finally proposed in February 2017. The data indicated this was a very valid
question that required attention.

Table 4.12
Comparison of Fit Indices in Models Fitted to Early Magneto Failure Data a
Model
M
249.0
250.9
243.1

Normal
Logistic
Weibull

SE
8.8
9.4
10.1

95% Confidence Interval
LL
UL
231.7
266.4
232.5
269.3
224.1
263.7

Note: M = mean; SE = Standard error; LL =lower limit; UL = upper limit. Relates to Figure 4.13.
a.

n = 178. Data include magnetos removed with less than 450 hours in service. Excludes removals

due to engine failures or overhauls.

Causes of Magneto Failures. During private discussions between the
researcher and mechanics, it was clear that magneto failures could have various
causes. Some failed due to a leaky oil seal on the magneto rotor shaft that connects
to a drive gear on the engine, allowing oil to seep up the shaft and into the magneto
distributor. The leaked oil caused electrical shorts between the points and the
ignition lead contact electrodes, resulting in misfiring of the plugs and engine
roughness, including backfiring that could damage the nylon distributor gear teeth.
Some were caused by leaking coils or condensers that caused shorting.
While some, particularly after 2011, were caused by problems with the electrodes
on the points contactors causing arcing, resulting in excessive metal loss, and
burning.
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Many more occurred because the rotor’s metal electrode finger fitted on the
nylon gear became unseated, dislodged, and failed to contact the lead electrodes
properly. This resulted in loss of correct timing and engine roughness.
Apparently, the manufacturer had traced the cause to a flawed installation
process that used hand fitting of the metal rotor onto the nylon distributor gear.
This resulted in an improper fit, causing the rotor electrode to become partially
unseated, creating shorting or timing errors and spark plugs firing anomalies.
Other failures resulted from missing or damaged gear teeth on the nylon
distributor timing gear. It is possible that some failures of the gear teeth might have
been due to a minor unnoticed production defect combined with wear and sudden
stress. It was also likely that the failures of the nylon gear teeth resulted from a
variety of other possible causes. These causes included having been the result of
excessive back loads imposed on the nylon gear if the engine backfired, misfired,
suffered a propeller strike while operating, or if the throttle was handled very
roughly causing large, sudden variations in engine rpm. Most of the foregoing
events can result in sudden and serious backlash and high stress loads on the entire
engine gear train, including on the magneto drive shaft gears up to the nylon
distributor gear in the magneto.
Other electrical failures in the magnetos could have resulted from failed or
weakened spring clips that held the spark lead contacts in the distributor electrode
contacts, or from worn or burned contacts on the rotor. A weak or failed contactor
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spring could cause a failure to deliver electrical energy to the respective spark plug
lead resulting in failure to ignite the fuel air mixture in the respective cylinder.
Other failures could result from a leaking condenser or shorted wire in
either the primary or secondary coil winding. Each of these faults could lead to
magneto failure or mistiming that affected normal ignition patterns and
performance. Wear on some nylon distributor gears also led to some magneto
ignition systems needing to be retimed to ensure spark was delivered at the correct
time to each spark plug.
The mechanics noted changes to the manufacturing process, but it could not
be established whether these changes impacted brand new or overhauled magnetos
that had experienced these problems. The peaking of failures indicated in Figure
4.11 had, according to FITA mechanics, resulted mostly from distributor rotor
failures and magneto drive shaft oil seal leaks. As illustrated in Figures 4.10, and
4.11, the number of recorded failure events during the last five years of the data
collection period for this study was much higher than for the entire period prior to
2012, indicating that some external factor may have changed around the 2012
period.
Service Bulletins. Slick Service Bulletin SB1-12 described problems with
ignition system points and recommended users: “Replace magneto or affected point
assemblies in subject magnetos at earliest convenient maintenance time not to
exceed the next scheduled maintenance period” (Slick, 2012, p. 1). Slick Service
Bulletin SB1-15 (Slick, 2015) and its subsequent revisions SB1-15A (Slick, 2018),
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and SB1-15B (Slick, 2021) described problems with the copper rotor electrode on
the nylon distributor gear in the affected magneto models. The first issue
recommended replacement of the distributor gear and its copper electrode finger,
the 2018 amended version required replacement of the distributor gear with copper
electrode finger with one fitted with a Monel metal electrode finger and updated the
list of affected products. The issue in 2021 added to the list of affected products.
The SBs each stated that: “Typical symptoms are unusual rpm drop during magneto
check, difficulty starting, and/or rough running engines” (Slick, 2015, p. 1., 2018,
p. 1., 2021, p. 1.). The Champion-Slick in-service warranty described in the above
SBs extended to one year or 500 in-service hours whichever was sooner. Labor was
not included. Notably, the Monel metal electrode finger was not installed on new
magnetos until August 2016 (Slick, 2021).
The above information regarding the service bulletins reveals a delay in
finding solutions that may be experienced with failures of products in service. They
also indicate that users of the products might not be promptly complying with the
recommended actions in an SB, or that the problem may be more widespread than
initially thought and extend to different models of the product. Early indications of
problems may be infrequent or sporadic and require more information and more
study before solutions can be developed. The first solution to the initial problem
may have to be revised as more information becomes available and the earlier
solution is tested in service. Whether the lag time should be measured in years or
months is beyond the scope of this study, but it is noteworthy that five continuous
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years of early failures were found in this study. It is probably fair to surmise that
most users would expect a speedier solution for a product defect.
Cost and Schedule Impact of Magneto Failures
As with any equipment failure, the cost and schedule impact of these
magneto failures to FIT Aviation must be considered. The researcher obtained the
estimated times and costs for the various tasks listed in Table 4.13 during
discussions with the maintenance department.
Opportunity Cost of Magneto Failures. In order to estimate of the costs
of the overall loss of productivity in revenue-producing activity caused by early
magneto failures, the researcher derived estimated values for the opportunity costs
from retail rates for aircraft rentals, instructor and maintenance labor, and actual
cost for an overhauled magneto. These included:
•

Maintenance labor at $65 per hour,

•

Purchase cost of an overhauled magneto at $850 per magneto,

•

Average rental cost at $200 per flight hour,

•

There are 10 hours per flight day,

•

There are four flight blocks per flight day,

•

Average flight-block length is 2.5 hours, and

•

Average duration of a flight in a flight block at 1.8 hours.

Table 4.13 presents the impact of early failure of magnetos on FITA resources
including maintenance labor and parts, aircraft, and revenue. To roughly estimate
total magneto service hours lost due to early failures, the difference between the
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expected overhaul time of 500 hours and the mean time in hours to early failure
taken from Table 4.13 multiplied by the number of early failures.
The opportunity cost of lost flight instructor wages was considered as well.
and determined as follows:
•

all lost flight hours were assumed to be dual flights with an instructor, and

•

each flight block included an estimated 0.6 hours of instructor time per for
briefing and debriefing times.

All costs were calculated to estimate the overall lost opportunity costs to FITA. The
result was an estimate of the costs of the overall loss of productivity in revenue
producing activity caused by early magneto failures.
Table 4.13 contains estimated costs based on estimated times for tasks and
estimated flight blocks and flight hours lost due to the 178 early failures. The
researcher has confidence in the estimates because they were based on reliable
archival data on magneto failures and a maintenance expert’s time estimates, and
on actual costs per hour in 2017. However, because these were estimates and were
not based on actual financial records that existed in a form that tracked losses
incrementally, the researcher assigned a range of error to the estimates. All
estimates were ranged on the lower side, and an error of 30% was chosen, meaning
that the costs in Table 4.13 could have been up to 30% lower but not higher. This
error of estimation was deemed to have existed because the times in Table 4.13
were provided as average times, and some tasks might be performed faster, some
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might be slower depending on time of day, workload, and priority of need for
aircraft types based on training demand.
There are multiple factors that can affect the total cost estimated in Table
4.13. These include factors such as (a) bad weather that can prevent flights and may
have resulted in some maintenance delay when extreme weather such as hurricanes
closed the operations, (b) occasions while a magneto failure was being repaired that
other work may have been performed on an aircraft delaying it in maintenance for a
longer time, and (c) maintenance working outside the flight day which would
reduce the opportunity cost of lost flight hours. Because no detailed historical data
was available to measure these potential factors behind delays in return to service,
the researcher decided that building an error into the estimated costs and using the
error value to calculate the range of likely costs while examining the effect of
different earlier magneto replacement times was necessary. Again, the researcher
cautions that, because these costs are based on informed estimates and not on actual
proven values for all cases, they should be considered as illustrative but not
exemplary.
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Table 4.13
Estimated Impact of Early Failures of Magnetos on FITA Resources
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Preventive Replacement Interval. Based on the cumulative probability of
early failure interpolated from Figure 4.12, the expected numerical distribution of
early failures can be estimated. The results are shown in Table 4.14.

Table 4.14
Estimated Magneto Early Failures at Under 450 Hours, in 50-hour Intervals
Intervals
for Hours in
Service

Cumulative
Probability
of
Failure a

Incrementa
l
Probability
of
Failure b

Incremental
Estimated in
Number of
Failures c

Cumulative
Estimated
Number of
Failures d

< 50

0.10

0.10

17.8

17.8

50 to 100

0.18

0.08

14.6

32.0

101 to 150

0.30

0.12

21.4

53.4

151 to 200

0.40

0.1

17.8

71.2

201 to 250

0.50

0.1

17.8

89.0

251 to 300

0.68

0.18

32.0

121.0

301 to 350

0.72

0.04

7.1

128.2

351 to 400

0.83

0.11

19.6

147.7

401 to 450

1.00

0.17

30.3

178.0

a

At end of interval, interpolated from graph in Figure 4.12. b Calculated within interval.

c

Probability multiplied by 178, the total number of early failures.

d

At end of interval.

Based on Table 4.13, the hourly cost for a magneto was estimated as the
cost of the overhauled magneto

$850

8 hours labor for unscheduled magneto change

$520

Total
Cost per hour of Service

$1370
$2.74
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Labor includes post-installation testing and timing, record keeping, packaging and
shipping, and administration of the removed magneto that must be included in the
cost of a replacement, for a total to $1370, or an estimated hourly cost of $2.74
($1,370/500) per magneto operating hour based on an estimated 500-hour service
life before overhaul.
If a magneto replacement is accomplished during a routine 100-hour
inspection, some of the labor cost for the magneto replacement will be reduced
because portions of the work would be shared with the other routine inspection
work. For example, removal and reinstallation of the cowlings, post-inspection run
up, retiming, and towing the airplane to and from the flight line would be shared.
The researcher estimated that about 2 hours of labor might be saved when
combining a magneto replacement with periodic inspection. This would result in a
lower hourly operating cost for a magneto at $2.48 per operating hour ($1,240/500
= $2.48).
The question of when to conduct an early, preventative replacement is
important because it will affect the number of early failures and the hourly
operating cost. The mean operating time to early failure in Figure 4.12 was 251.35
hours, the median was 254 hours, and the standard deviation was 135.41 hours.
Because of the large standard deviation, a decision to replace all magnetos at the
mean time to early failure or the median time of early failure could not guarantee
that 50% of the early failures would be prevented.
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A range of replacement times matching periodic 100-hour maintenance
inspections and 50-hour servicing intervals is shown in Table 4.14. It compares the
numbers of early failures expected at each time interval based on the interpolation
of the cumulative probability of failure from Figure 4.12 for the subset comprised
of magneto replacements under 450 hours.
Based on the information in Table 4.13 and Table 4.14, a new calculation
was made to see the effect of implementing a mitigation strategy of preventative
replacement that would coincide with periodic 100-hour inspections and show the
effect of replacement at the mean 250 hours. All calculations for Table 4.15 were
made using the $2.48 per operating hour cost and factoring for the possible unused
hours, as follows:
replacement at 500 service hours, cost is $1240/500 = $2.48 per hour;
replacement at 400 hours is $1240/500 x 500/400 = $3.10 per hour;
replacement at 300 hours is $1240/500 x 500/300 = $4.13 per hour;
replacement at the mean 250 hours is $1240/500 x 500/250 = 4.96 per hour;
replacement at 200 hours is $1240/500 x 500/200 = $6.20 per hour; and
replacement at 100 hours is $1240/500 x 500/100 = $12.40 per hour.
From Table 4.13, the total opportunity cost, including lost flight revenue, of
the 178 early failures was estimated as $442,043, or $2,483 per early failure (due to
rounding down this total changed by $69.00 in Table 4.15). Using the $2,483 value
and applying it to the incremental replacement times in Table 4.15 shows that
replacement at the mean of the early failures set might prevent up to 89 early
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failures and might fail to prevent an equal number, with an incremental additional
cost per magneto operating hour of $2.48 more per operating hour than the cost per
operating hour if the magnetos lasted until 450 hours or more, that is a total of
$4.96 versus $2.48 per operating hour. Unfortunately, the large standard deviation
of the sample makes it difficult to recommend an ideal preventative replacement
time. A risk-based decision would be required to determine a best strategy because
the need for early preventative replacement is certainly indicated. Of course, the
option will remain to do nothing and accept the current risk level and losses.

Table 4.15
Estimated Costs and Savings of Preventing Early Failures at Different Preventative
Magneto Replacement Intervals
Preventive
Replacement
Interval,
Hours in
Service

Number
of failures
probably
prevented

Cost of
failures
probably
prevented
at $2483

Hourly
operating
cost of
preventative
replacement

< 50

17.8

$42,211.

160

$397,776.

$24.80

50 to 100

32.

$79,555.

146

362, 418.

$12.40

101 to 150

53.

$132,592.

125

$309,381.

$8.27

151 to 200

71.

$198,149.

107

$265,184.

$6.20

201 to 250b

89

$220,987.

89

$220,987

$4.96

251 to 300

121.

$300,542.

57

$141,431.

$4.13

128.

$318,221.

50

$123,752.

$3.54

351 to 400

148

$366,838

30

$75,383.

$3.10

401 to 450 d

178

$441,974

0

0

$2.48

301 to 350

a

Number of Value of
failures
failures
probably
not
not
prevented
prevented a at $2483

c

Interpolated from Figure 4.12. b Mean of failures is 251.35 hours, from Figure 4.12. c Mean over

useful service life, from Figure 4.1. d Counted as a 500-hour normal life replacement.
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Research questions RQ3 and RQ4 required an analysis of the likely effects
of the magneto failures on the flight school training and maintenance resources.
Only the early failures were used to calculate the estimates of the effects and costs
of different magneto replacement times. Table 4.13 shows the estimated aggregate
opportunity costs of the 178 early failures. Tables 4.14 and 4.15 show information
intended to guide the selection of a most appropriate time to replace magnetos
using a preventive maintenance mitigation strategy of earlier replacement required
by research question RQ4. The intent of a risk mitigation strategy is to prevent
some early failures, reduce the hazard of failures in operation, and reduce the costs
in a justifiable manner for the flight school. Based on the assumed error range
identified, Table 4.15 shows the estimated benefits and remaining costs for several
options for preventative replacement during a routine maintenance inspection.
Whether or not these estimated savings could be realized at the values
shown in Table 4.15 might depend on the influences of unidentified external factors
that could not be included in the analysis. The manufacturer's service bulletins
showed awareness of some problems and that they were working to improve the
reliability of the magneto components because problems with some components
were causing the early failures (Champion, 2012, 2015, 2018, 2021). Poor
maintenance (or even non-existent maintenance) was cited by the manufacturer as a
possible cause factor. Obviously, those variables could not be included in the
model, nor could replacing magnetos at the mean value prevent all failures.

124

Statistically, somewhere between the -2SD value and the mean would be an ideal
time to overhaul the magnetos, but as shown by the large SD value in Figure 4.12,
the unpredictability of timing of individual failures would remain as a risk. Only
those failures beyond the level chosen for an overhaul interval might be prevented,
meaning a shorter interval for a change should improve the effectiveness of the
preventive measure. However, the shorter the interval for overhaul, the greater the
hourly cost for the magnetos, so a management decision for the actual overhaul
interval would be required based on the financial risk and the operational risk of a
failure in flight.
The FAA guidance on performance based certification of aeronautical
products for aircraft in the size category that FITA operates recommends that a
product classed as complex hardware having a failure condition classified as:
probable and having a minor effect on the flight should have a probability of less
than 10-3; classified as remote with major effect should have a probability of less
than 10-4; classified as extremely remote with hazardous effect should have a
probability of less than 10-5; and classified as extremely improbable with
catastrophic effect should have a probability of less than 10-6 on single engine
airplanes; and the latter three classes for multi-engine airplanes have more remote
probabilities one level lower (FAA, 2011). The guidance relates to new products so
is not applicable to previously certified aircraft or products and is not applicable to
the magnetos in this study that were certified with the aircraft engine as an engine
component.
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A comparison of the probability of failure of FITA's magnetos with the
2011 recommended standard shows that FITA had 518 magneto replacements over
312,409 operating hours as shown in Table 4.1 and 178 were operationally defined
as early failures in this study. Using simple arithmetic that equates to a failure
probability of 178/312,409 = 5.7 x 10 -4, or .00057 per operating hour per magneto.
Because two magnetos are fitted on an engine, the probability of a single magneto
failure doubles to 1.14 x 10 -3 and the probability of a double magneto failure would
decrease to 3.25 x 10-7, assuming the magnetos are truly independent.
Discussion can continue about whether a single magneto failure is minor,
major, hazardous, or catastrophic; it certainly depends on several other factors, for
example, what was the outcome of the failure? Did engine damage result from the
single magneto failure, was it possible to continue the flight on the remaining
magneto, was a suitable emergency landing area within gliding distance, was the
skill level of the pilot adequate to deal with a magneto failure, was the weather
good or bad, and did it happen in daytime or night-time. All the foregoing factors
could affect the severity of the outcome. Ideally, based on the FAA 2011
certification guidance there should be no more than10-3 failures (.001) per operating
hour for a probable minor failure condition. FITA's magnetos had 1.14 times that
probability of failure in any one operating hour (.00114). The analysis in this study
indicated that they had a 57% early failure rate over a 500-hour useful service life.
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Inferential Statistics
One objective of the research was to examine the MTBF for each year and
to investigate any differences in MTBF between each year of the study. Insufficient
failure data were available in the years 2007 to 2010 to develop meaningful
descriptions of differences in failure rates by year, and, for later years, when broken
out by type of aircraft, the yearly samples were too small to be usefully compared.
The objective for inferential analysis was to explore for any common factor
related to the variance in mean times to magneto failure between the four aircraft
types (categorical variables or groups) and whether any common factor might be
indicated by correlations between the group data sets. The data set was prepared for
analysis by including all data available for the four aircraft type categorical
variables and then equalizing the sample sizes for each type. The left and right
magnetos provided two more nominal variables for each group. The dependent
variable consisted of the mean time to failure and/or replacement of the magnetos.
The sample came from all magneto failures and/or replacements before 600 hours;
magneto removals due to engine failure or TBO overhaul of engines were not
included in the sample. The resulting 8 equal sample sizes of n = 35, (∑n(1-8) = 280)
were run in a one-way ANOVA model using JMP14™
The equal sample-size groups were used in the ANOVA model, noting that
larger unequalized samples were run at least twice using the larger samples before
equalizing them to n = 35. After running the larger sample sizes, the newly
produced randomized samples of n = 35 were run in the ANOVA model to test if
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any different results were indicated from one sample set to another. The test
analysis indicated that there were no notable differences in the descriptive statistics
between the randomized reduced samples from each of the larger samples. For each
type of aircraft, one randomized sample-data set was used for comparisons with the
enlarged samples from the smaller data samples. The differences resulting from
substitution of the mean for one or two data points in the smaller samples would
have the effect of tending the sample toward the mean, but because far less than 4%
of the data was substituted, the small change would not likely have a significant
effect on the results.
The results of the one-way ANOVA are shown in Figure 4.13 and reveal no
statistically significant difference in mean time to failure and/or replacement of
magnetos between the four aircraft types, F (3, 277) = .56, p = .64, α = .05. Figure
4.13 shows the four group variable's means that, when analyzed pairwise for all
pairs and each pair, respectively, the Tukey-Kramer HSD and Student t tests,
indicated that no significant difference existed between the mean times to failure
and/or replacement between aircraft types. For ease of calculation and further
comparisons in this part of the study, the sample came from the larger sample set of
replacements under 600-hours shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 from which the mean
time to failure and/or replacement was rounded up to 350 hours. The rounded up
350-hour mean value was 100 hours greater than the mean time to failure of the
early failure data set that used the subset of data from that used in Figures 4.1 and
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4.2 but containing only all replacements under 450 hours shown in Figure 4.14 and
operationally defined as early failures.

Figure 4.13.
One Way Analysis of Variance of Time to Failure in Hours by Aircraft Type

Note: n = 280. Four equalized sample sets come from data set of all magneto failures
and/or replacements below 600 hours, Piper Arrows data excluded, M = Archer 346.9,
Aspen 340.5, Avidyne 318.1, Seminole 343.7, F (3, 277) = .56, p = .64, q*= 3.14,
t = 2.59.

Preliminary analysis. Results of the analysis of the entire original raw data
set were examined for failure distribution and descriptive statistics in the previous
section of this chapter. Some patterns of early failures were detected, and a large
difference in the frequency of failures was indicated over the last five years of the
study period. No specific causes could be assigned using statistics.
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Data set modifications. Modification of the original raw data set was
achieved by excluding all magneto failures or replacements above 600 hours
because of the FITA policy of sending the magnetos to a contract overhaul facility
at 450 to 600 hours of service as a means of compliance with the manufacturer’s
SB. The failures were analyzed by aircraft type and by left or right magneto, and
then the samples were further reduced to contain only early failures, meaning
failures that occurred below 450 hours service time. Reducing the samples resulted
in slightly unequal sample sizes when the data was grouped based on airplane type.
As noted in the descriptive statistics section of this chapter, the group samples of
failures and replacements below 600 hours were reduced and matched to 8 equal
sizes by randomizing the selection of data points from data with more than n = 35
and by treating the smaller samples for missing data by substitution of the mean for
the very small numbers of missing data points in each set if a resulting group
sample contained less than n = 35.
Missing Data. Missing data from group samples was minimal and resulted
because some of the group sample sizes were slightly less than the desired n = 35.
The solution was to plug the sample mean into the undersized samples, matching
the sample sizes by bringing the two undersized groups n up to 35, and involving
only three instances of data substitution. The effect on the subsequent statistical
analysis was minimal, only slightly reducing the estimated SD in each of the
affected groups, and slightly reducing any estimated correlation r values between
the affected groups (Cohen et al., 2003, pp. 442-451).
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Outlier Analysis. Outliers were generally not a consideration. All failure
and replacement values above 600 hours were intentionally excluded from the
original raw data set for the reasons explained above under the subheading of
database modifications. No low values were removed because the low values were
the targeted variable in the study, the early failures. The resulting data set was
checked using JMP14™ for linearity.
Regression Assumptions. Based on the previous figures and tables, the
distribution of failures clearly indicated a near normal distribution for each aircraft
type and for the overall fleet. For linear regression, using 8 sample sizes of n = 35
from the failures under 450 hours of service was not possible because they were too
small. The independent variables were categorical and consisted of the aircraft
types. Each aircraft type constituted a group that had two nominal variables
consisting of the left or right magnetos. Analysis was conducted using the raw data
set and was done again using values from the data set of the under 600 hours of
service failures that excluded the routine replacements. The exclusion of routine
replacements would have reduced the data set to consist only of values representing
magneto failures under 450 hours of service and the individual sample sets were
too small for analysis. Because this was an attempt to discover whether aircraft
type was a factor, it was decided to take the eight n = 35 equalized sample subsets
from the under 600-hour data set. The targeted variable in the equalized sample was
the mean time to failure of the left or right magnetos within the aircraft type group.
Multicollinearity was not a threat because the categorical variables, aircraft types,

131

could not interact and affect one another. A check of the residuals in the samples
indicated near normal distributions. The results of the ANOVA are shown in Figure
4.13.
Results of Hypotheses Testing
Hypothesis 1. The mean time between the MISF will be lower than the
manufacturer's recommended current overhaul interval fleet-wide, by aircraft type,
by year, and over the ten-and-one-quarter year study period.
Table 4.1 shows the analysis for the entire raw data set N = 518 and
indicates that the grand mean time before replacement in-service of left magnetos
was 69.9 hours higher, and right magnetos 52 hours higher, than the manufacturer's
recommended overhaul interval of 500 hours (left: n = 277, M = 569.9, and right: n
= 280, M = 552.). The result was skewed to a higher mean value due to the lack of
detailed data about overhauls in the first five years of the study (as discussed earlier
in this chapter). The data set was rerun with all values above 600 hours removed.
Table 4.2 indicates that using this revised data set in the model resulted in mean
times between failures or replacements for the entire FITA fleet (including the
Piper Arrow data, and with all required 500-hour overhauls included) reduced to
328.2 hours for the left magnetos and 339.1 for the right magnetos, values that were
between 170 and 160 hours less than a 500-hour overhaul interval, (n = 340, M =
333.1). With all normal overhaul replacements made in accordance with the
manufacturer's SB for 500 hours excluded, that is, by excluding all failures and
replacements above 450 hours from the model, Table 4.12 and Figure 4.12 show a
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near normal distribution of early failures that had an estimated rounded mean of
250 hours (from Figure 4.12: n = 178, M = 251.35, SD =135.71 SE = 10.41), which
meant that 178/518 = 34% of all magnetos in the entire raw data set were failing on
average at less than the service life expected prior to being due for overhaul. When
compared to the data set of under 600-hours n = 319, the failure rate showed
178/319 = 56% early failure rate. Fleet wide, by aircraft type, and over the entire
10.25-year period the mean time to failure were all less than the manufacturer's
recommended overhaul interval. Due to very small sample sizes when broken out
by year and by aircraft type in each year no attempt was made to determine whether
the mean time to failure was the same in each year and that part of H1 could not be
addressed. Decision: retain H1.
H1Ø: MTBF ≥ current overhaul interval (fleet-wide, by type, by year, and
over the 10.25-years). Other than as described above, the analysis indicated that, for
the entire raw dataset, the MTBF equalled or exceeded the current overhaul
interval. However, when the data was cleaned to only include all replacements
under 600 hours and exclude all values above 600 hours the results changed, and all
mean times to failure were lower than the current overhaul interval fleet wide, by
aircraft type and over the entire 10.25-year period. As explained in the foregoing
discussion of H1, it was not possible to determine the failure rate in each year so
that portion of H1 Ø was not addressed. Decision: reject H1 Ø.
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Hypothesis 2. The MISFs will not indicate a normal distribution pattern
over the 10.25-years or within each year, nor will the MTBF be the same in each
year.
The MISFs and MTBF from the first five years of data could not be
determined due to lack of sufficiently detailed data. The final five years of the data
set indicated both near normal and near logistic distribution patterns with the near
normal model having a slightly better fit based on the distribution analysis. Sample
sizes year by year were too small to determine distribution patterns within each
year, precluding accurate detection of MTBF variations by year. A much larger
sample would have been needed to determine either of those two sub-hypotheses.
Decision: reject H2.
H2Ø: The MISF distribution pattern will be a normal distribution over the
10.25-years, with each MTBF (n 1-10) being the same each year.
The aggregated raw data indicated a near normal distribution of failures
over the entire 10.25 years; however, it was impossible to determine whether the
MTBF data was the same in each year of the 10.25 years because the yearly sample
sizes were too small to draw such conclusions. As shown in Figures 4.10 and 4.11,
from 2011 onward to the end of the study period in early 2017, the frequency of
failures increased and consistently showed near normal distributions when
examined by aircraft types and left or right magnetos. The analysis indicated that
the MTBF began to decrease after 2011. However, because the data was
inconclusive regarding the numbers and times of in-house magneto overhauls
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performed between 2007 and 2011, the researcher did not compare those years with
the data from 2011 to 2017. Decision: Retain H2Ø in part because the distribution
was near normal and because the last five years of data indicated some consistency
in early failure frequencies.
Hypothesis 3. The MISFs caused losses of flight school resources.
Table 4.13 shows the estimated task times and hourly labor costs based on
the researcher's discussions with the flight school maintenance and training
department SME's inputs. The table then shows those costs multiplied by the total
number of early magneto failures experienced, n = 178, and arrives at estimated
costs of all early failures over the 10.25-years. Because the failures occurred, losses
occurred, unquestionably, but the analysis is based on informed estimates alone
because the actual financial magnitude of the loss was not tracked or recorded by
FITA. The researcher calculated the range of the estimated losses shown in Tables
4.14 and 4.15 using the maintenance 50-hour service and 100-hour inspection
cycles to provide an example of the possible benefits and costs based from
interpolations of the cumulative probability of failure shown for two data sets and
calculated estimated hourly operating costs for the magnetos. A caution is
necessary: the values are estimated, so no statistical proof or test is possible for this
information and it is simply to give an example of the possible values of lost
opportunity costs and the costs of loss mitigation by using earlier overhauls of
magnetos.
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H3Ø: losses due to MISF = 0. Per Tables 4.14 and 4.15 the estimated losses
were ≠ 0 and were estimated to have been substantially higher than zero. Decision:
Retain H3, reject H3Ø.
Hypothesis 4. There will be a more appropriate MIS overhaul interval than
the one currently used by FITA.
The overhaul interval was not equal to the MTBF; the analysis indicated that the
overhaul interval is almost double the mean time between the early failures, clearly
suggesting that changing the overhaul interval should be carefully considered. The
reduction in missed opportunity losses would offset the higher costs for magnetos.
An early failure rate of 55.7% was indicated giving substance to the need to adopt a
more appropriate overhaul interval. Because the SD was such a large value no
specific recommendation was made by the researcher about the overhaul interval
other than it should be shorter. How much shorter the interval should be will have
to be a FITA management decision that balances the acceptability of financial risks
and operational risks.
H4Ø: current overhaul interval = mean time between failures interval.
Analysis of the data for each aircraft type and each left or right magneto nominal
variable indicated that many magnetos were replaced before the 500-hour overhaul
interval. Two values resulted, depending on the data in the model: for all magneto
failures and replacements under 600 hours, the MTBF 343 hours was the grand
mean for the fleet in a near normal distribution. The MTBF for the early-failure
data below 450 hours, was 251 hours in a near normal distribution. Each of the
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normal, logistic and Weibull distribution analysis models used for the data
indicated MTBFs that did not coincide with the 500 hours overhaul interval.
Adoption of a more appropriate overhaul interval would prevent some of the
financial losses due to early failure, however, this would also increase the cost per
magneto operating hour. Decision: Retain H4. Reject H4Ø.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations
Summary of Study
The purpose of this study was to explore the apparent increase in the
frequency of failures of magneto ignition systems operated in a collegiate flightschool aircraft fleet. The researcher selected several variables for investigation: the
type of aircraft in which failures occurred, the years in which failures occurred, the
mean time between failures. The targeted variable for the study was the most
appropriate overhaul interval for the magneto ignition systems. The researcher
chose an exploratory, ex-post-facto correlational design for the study. An ANOVA
was used to examine the variances of the means of the samples using four aircraft
types as categorical variables. Data were retrieved from 10.25 years of archival
airplane engine maintenance records from 2007 to 2017. The researcher's
understanding of the magneto failures was supplemented by information obtained
from the researcher's discussions with certificated mechanics, a maintenance
manager, and flight operations managers who flew the aircraft and managed the
training programs.
Summary of Findings
The data indicated that the frequency of magneto failures increased after
2011 and continued at a higher frequency until the end of the study period in 2017.
The data analysis results showed the mean in-service operating hours for failures
and replacements that occurred before 600 hours was 349 hours (Table 4.2). Of
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note, the manufacturer's recommended overhaul interval was 500 hours. The
researcher operationally defined early failures to be all magneto replacements
before 450 in-service operating hours and grouped those in a subset of data. The
MTBF in that subset was 251 hours (Figure 4.12), half of the overhaul interval.
Two other data sets were analyzed: all magneto failures and replacements before
600 in-service hours that included normal time-out replacements that had a mean
time to failure or replacement of 345 hours; and a subset of that arranged into eight
equal-sized samples based on aircraft type and left or right magneto that each had
mean times to failure or replacement ranging from 318 to 360 in-service hours
(Table 4.11).
All the data sets' MTBF indicated that the current overhaul interval of 500hours service life before overhaul did not prevent early failures of magnetos. Either
improvements in the magnetos to lower the failure rate, or a more appropriate
overhaul interval would be needed to reduce the losses resulting from premature
failures. Opportunity costs were calculated based on informed estimates to
determine the losses to FITA due to the early magneto failures. By using
interpolations from cumulative probability graphs of the failures, a range of
benefits and costs was developed showing the results of options to have earlier
overhaul of the magnetos done at maintenance inspection intervals ranging from 50
hours to 400 hours. All these options would result in a higher cost per flight hour
for magnetos than keeping the current 500-hour overhaul interval. Costs were
estimated based on losses over the entire 10.25-year study period, but the data
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indicated that most of these occurred in the years after 2011. Given that a magneto
should last 500 hours before being overhauled, some unknown external factors
must have been responsible for the higher frequency of the early failures that
commenced in 2011.
The researcher found no standards for magneto performance or reliability in
the SAE, MILSPECs, FAA regulations, or anywhere the researcher looked except
the 2011 publication of the FAA AC 23-1309-1E, part of the FAA guidance related
to the change to performance-based airworthiness certification (FAA, 2011). The
researcher was not able to identify specific external factors contributing to the early
failures based on the data analysis. However, some potential external factors were
described, including corporate ownership changes that may or may not have
affected the workforce, and changes to the FAA parts manufacturing approval
policy that may have allowed non-OEM parts to be introduced into the supply
chain. The manufacturer’s service bulletins described two causes of failures and
these coincided with information provided by the mechanics, although the bulletins
were published following the failure events, a normal sequence in any remedial
action that requires troubleshooting and analysis (Champion, 2012, 2015, 2018,
2021).
The analysis of variance indicated that there was no difference between
MTBF for airplane types, indicating that a group membership variable was not
affecting the failures. Left magnetos fitted with impulse couplers were slightly
more prone to failure than right magnetos that did not have the couplers fitted. In
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2015, the flight school installed impulse couplers in all right magnetos to improve
engine starting, resulting in an almost identical MTBF for both left and right
magnetos in the two years following 2015, as indicated by the data. There were
insufficient data points after 2015 to make a meaningful comparison of the
differences with data prior to 2015. No specific differences between types of
airplane use or handling were identified in the study. Although some user factors
on each airplane type might have been different, the MTBF did not differ
significantly between airplane types, and group membership based on airplane type
was considered an insignificant factor. Many magneto failures were detected during
periodic maintenance inspection intervals while most of the remaining failures were
detected by pilots during pre-flight checks. The pre-flight and maintenance
detections prevented some engine issues in flight due to magneto problems, and
most rough running engine in-flight events resulted from spark plug problems or
magneto timing changes due to wear of the nylon gear.
Conclusions and Inferences
Research Question 1
RQ 1: What is the failure rate of the flight school’s magneto ignition
system failure rate expressed as mean time between failures of magneto or MIS
components fleet-wide, by aircraft type, by year, and over 10.25-years?
The MIS components failure data were not analyzed for several reasons.
The data indicated that there were extremely few failures of ignition leads and
ignition switches; most stayed in service to the engine TBO. The few that did fail
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were found to have been rubbing on some part of the engine and were discovered
during maintenance inspections. Only one event involving ignition switch failure
was identified and that was described in Chapter 1. Because there was no tear down
data from the overhaul company, the failure rates for the internal magneto
components consisting of the coil, condenser, rotor, and points could not be
determined.
Spark plugs had higher rates of failure and/or replacement than magnetos,
usually involving failures of individual spark plugs. Most often, spark plug
electrode fouling will result from engine operation with an overly rich fuel-air
mixture that leaves partially burnt fuel residue as carbon deposits on the electrodes.
Fouling may also result from prolonged ground idling of the engines, and not
utilizing engine spark plug burnout technique to clear the fouling by operating with
a lean fuel-air mixture for a short time at higher engine speed. The researcher
realized early in the data collection process that analysis of the spark plug data as
MIS subcomponents would have been extremely complicated due to frequent
changes of spark plug models.
The study was further hindered by the total lack of data for magneto
subcomponent failures because of the lack of any tear down reports from magneto
overhaul facilities. For the foregoing reasons, the various analyses of data were
confined solely to magneto failures and replacements.
Table 4.11 shows the MTBF for the left and right magnetos fitted to the
engines on the four aircraft types over the 10.25-year period and was derived from
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the eight equalized sample subsets from the early failures and replacements under
600 in-service hours data set. It was not possible to demonstrate the MTBF for each
of the years because the sample sizes in each of the first five years were much too
small. Table 4.11 shows the results from using eight equal-sized subsets of data
from the under 600 in service hours data sample and shows the fleet's grand mean
time between early failures or timed-out replacements was 345.5 hours.
A distribution analysis shown in Figure 4.1 used the entire data set of all
failures and replacements under 600 hours and M = 345.25, SD = 160.8, SE = 9.33.
Table 4.11 also shows the means by aircraft type; no significant difference was
noted between groups, meaning that aircraft type (group membership) was not a
factor affecting the magneto failures. The results of the analysis of the distribution
of early failures before 450 in-service hours may be seen in Figure 4.12 (M = 251),
and Table 4.12, where the parametric estimate of the MTBF is shown to be 249
hours, or approximately 250 in-service hours. The researcher believed the
250-hours MTBF was an important statistic because it was derived from the sample
subset that included only all failures before 450 hours and excluded all normal
replacements between 450 to 600 hours.
Research Question 2
RQ 2: What does the distribution pattern of the magneto ignition system
failures indicate yearly and overall?
The analysis of the data indicated that compliance with the manufacturer’s
SB recommending a 500-hour magneto overhaul interval did not prevent early
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failures, nor was the flight school's maintenance strategy of contracting out the
overhauls successful in preventing early magneto failures. Regarding the frequency
distribution patterns by year shown in Figures 4.10 and 4.11, an unidentified
external factor or variable appeared to have doubled the number of early failures in
2011 and quadrupled them in 2012 when compared to the earlier years of the study.
The frequency of early failures increased in 2014 to an alarming six to seven times
the number experienced in the entire first five years of the study period. The
number of early failures per year continued to remain high through to the end of the
first quarter of 2017 when the data sample collection ended. Overall, the patterns
showed increasingly frequent early failures and statistical analysis indicated that
there was little difference in the variance between aircraft types and no covariance.
The results indicated that the problem was with the magnetos.
Research Question 3
RQ 3: What effects have magneto ignition system failures had on the flight
school’s operations and maintenance resources?
Estimated opportunity costs, that is losses in resources due to early failures,
were quantified in Table 4.13. Significant losses in flight block availability and
flight hours were indicated along with additional maintenance costs resulting from
premature failures of magnetos. The cost of losses came from missed opportunity
for revenue and higher real costs per hour for magneto operations. Airplane out-ofservice time for magneto repair and replacement also contributed toward estimated
delays that resulted in some students not completing their flight courses within the
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semester. The flight school did not track such losses as a specific financial line
object as a usual procedure, so hard financial data was not available. Therefore, the
researcher relied on credible informed estimates provided by SMEs to develop
Table 4.13. Tables 4.11 through 4.15 show results of data analysis related to
estimated costs and options for a new overhaul interval.
Research Question 4
RQ 4: What is the most appropriate overhaul interval for the magneto
ignition systems?
The researcher classified all magneto failures and replacements as those that
had occurred from 0 to 600 hours. Within the 0 to 600-hour data set, the grand
mean of all failures and replacements for four aircraft types was 343 hours in the
normally distributed model and 354 hours in the logistically distributed model,
approximately 350 hours. The researcher recalculated the mean of the early failures
with all the timed-out magneto replacements above 450 hours excluded. The data
set of all failures under 450 hours had an MTBF of 250 hours. The researcher
considered this to be the most significant statistic in the study because it was only
half of the recommended hours to the currently used magneto overhaul interval.
The researcher did not want to specify a more appropriate overhaul interval because
the large SD in the sample indicated that there would be some imprecision in any
time chosen. The benefit/cost comparison between various overhaul intervals that
coincide with periodic inspections to reduce labor costs shows the changes in
hourly cost of magnetos for each option, but leaves the decision to FITA
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management, who must determine the acceptable levels of risk the company is
willing to accept for financial risk and operational safety risk. A change of overhaul
interval is needed to lower the losses unless there is evidence in the years following
those in this study that the early failure rate is decreasing following product
reliability improvements by the manufacturer.
Implications
Implications Relative to Theory
This exploratory study could not use a theoretical model, so no direct
implications were related to theory. If information about the original reliability
goals of the magneto manufacturer and the engine manufacturer had been available
for the study, examining the data through the lens of reliability theory might have
been possible. The researcher could not establish the degree to which the
manufacturers gained information by data sharing concerning the in-service
failures, other than through service difficulty reports prepared by users of the
products. The researcher did not know whether the magneto overhaul shops
communicated with magneto manufacturers. It is difficult for researchers to access
such proprietary information. Manufacturers are typically reluctant to share
proprietary material outside the company, possibly due in part to legal liability
concerns.
Implications Relative to Prior Research
The only prior research of this nature identified by the researcher was the
study of general aviation aircraft reliability completed for NASA (Pettit &
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Turnbull, 2001). Based on results from their ex-post-facto study they concluded by
showing the reliability as a probability of failure per flight hour.
Compared to Pettit and Turnbull's study, this research used a much less
granular and more finely focused look at a vital subcomponent of the engine, the
aircraft ignition system. Both studies have indicated that the ex-post-facto approach
to aviation research into failures is useful. It could be more useful if a greater level
of detail were available concerning subcomponent failures. By following the
NASA (Pettit & Turnbull, 2001) reliability calculation method, FITA's 10.25 years
of magneto operations (178 early magneto failures in 156,500 flight hours,
approximately 313,000 magneto operating hours) would have a failure rate of
slightly higher than 1.14 x 10-3 failures per flight hour, and 5.7 x 10-5 failures per
magneto operating hour. The data indicated that most of the early breakdowns
occurred in the last five years of the study period, showing a higher probability of
failure during those years. A total of 125 of the 178 failure events occurred in the
final five years of the study. With approximately 78,250 hours flown in those last
five years of the sample, the likelihood of a magneto loss was 125/78,250 = 0.0016
failures per flight hour, or 1.6 failures per one thousand flight hours, within the
years 2012 to 2017. Based on this, and assuming the magnetos are truly
independent, the probability of a dual-magneto failure would be 2.55 x 10-6 or 2.55
failures per million flight hours for FITA. Based on the single-case sample used in
this study, the accuracy of any predicted probability of failure bears caution
because external factors could have affected the failures.
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The two probability of failure per flight hour estimates, 0.0011 overall and
0.0016 between 2012 to 2017, became very interesting to the researcher compared
with the most recent FAA AC-23-1309-1E (FAA, 2011) guidance for small aircraft
certification. In the non-mandatory AC document, a table shows the allowable
quantitative probability of failure per flight hour for hardware (such as magnetos).
For any event with a minor severity safety effect and a qualitative likelihood of
occurrence as "probable," the table showed an allowable probability of less than10-3
or less than one failure per thousand flight hours. If the two magnetos on an engine
were truly independent, the likelihood of a dual-magneto failure would become less
than 10-6 or one failure per one million flight hours. For the minor safety event just
described, a single-magneto failure would affect the airplane by resulting in a
“...slight reduction in functional capabilities or safety margins; physical discomfort
for occupants; and, a slight increase in workload or use of emergency procedures
by the flight crew” (FAA, 2011, p. 23).
The above pertains to a minor safety effect. If major, hazardous, or
catastrophic failure conditions were applied for single magneto, the allowable
probability expressed in the AC becomes less than 10-4, 10-5, and 10-6, respectively
(FAA, 2011, p. 23).
It may seem convenient to classify all possible failures into a probability
matrix with only four failure-condition classifications; however, important details
may be hidden. For example, is a single magneto failure in flight a probable minor
event? Can a single magneto failure cause total loss of engine power, or can a
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failure of spark timing cause engine damage such as a cracked cylinder or broken
connecting rod? Is the loss of engine power in flight a hazardous event in a singleengine airplane or in a small twin-engine airplane? While there may be various
opinions about the correct answers to the foregoing questions, the real question is
whether the current magnetos used on FITA's airplanes could meet the new
certification guidelines. The answer is that FITA's single magneto failure rate of
1.14 x 10-3 per flight hour was higher than the FAA guidelines for failures with
minor safety effects. Could an electro-mechanical magneto be designed and built to
meet the new guidelines after over 100 years of development of magneto
technology? The answer is probably not, or someone would have done so already.
Are more reliable ignition systems available? Possibly, although establishing their
comparative reliability would require a study contrasting electro-mechanical
magneto ignition systems with electronic ignition systems. The same 2011 FAA
guidelines could be used as a target value for reliability in such a comparative
study.
Implications for Aviation Practice
The results of this study indicated that following the manufacturer’s SB's
recommended practice to inspect and overhaul magnetos at 500 in-service hours
did not prevent early magneto failures in the flight-school's fleet. For FITA, the
only real benefit of contracting out the overhauls was to ensure recovery of partial
costs of early losses by the overhaul shop's one-year replacement warranty. The
early failures were much more frequent than expected because the SB
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recommendation evokes an expectation that the magnetos should last until the
recommended overhaul interval. The magneto manufacturer may obtain tear-down
data from their approved overhaul shops and track failure trends, determine root
causes, and replace or recommend replacement of components that fail too
frequently. Improvements in the magnetos' durability would help provide troublefree service until the recommended overhaul interval. If the SDR program
possessed all magneto failure reports, perhaps the manufacturer would have had an
earlier awareness of the scope of the early failures.
For several years, the FAA has been busy amending and upgrading FAR
Part 23 from what were essentially 1950’s prescriptive requirements for aircraft
piston engine certification to a performance-based assessment of reliability. Under
the revised certification process, the manufacturer must demonstrate the assessment
methodology and results to the FAA's satisfaction before the FAA approves the
product. The FAA rule change aimed to modernize the certification process and
improve the reliability and safety of aircraft parts, components, and equipment. The
reliability rules in Part 25 for large airplanes, and to a lesser extent under Part 23
for small airplanes, are satisfied by the practice of life-limiting the parts,
components, equipment and limiting the shelf life of spares in some cases. The lifelimit rules and practices aim to prevent failures from happening in-service by
removal and replacement before failures occur. Probability and reliability go handin-hand, and the best balances are always sought to ensure reliability in service and,
consequently, lower the probability of unsafe events related to failures.
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The results of this study indicated that the SB recommending operators
perform the 500-hour interval inspection and overhaul replacement of replaceable
parts in magnetos did not prevent early failures. Even though the new certification
rules do not apply to the magnetos in this study because they were on engines
approved decades ago, an important question remains. Should anyone consider a
dual magneto failure rate of 2.7 per million flight hours an acceptable level of
reliability for a life-critical ignition system? Is only a dual magneto failure likely to
result in catastrophic result or can a single magneto failure also have catastrophic
results? The answer in a random world is that the prediction of any individual
safety event cannot be made using probability analysis. Is it possible to design a
magneto offering more durability and reliability? The question may become moot
in the future as the world moves toward electric aircraft engines.
Generalizability, Limitations, and Delimitations
Generalizability
Because the sample was not a random sample from the target population,
the results of this study are not statistically generalizable outside the single-case
population. Nevertheless, the lessons learned from this study, including the utility
of single-case aviation research methodology, could be used for additional studies
of other flight schools' magneto failures.
Limitations and Delimitations
The limitations of this study were the non-experimental research design, the
lack of a random sample, lack of reliability targets that prevented failure prediction,
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and the confinement of only 10.25 years of ex-post-facto data collection. This study
design is less valuable than a longitudinal study that could study changes to
magneto reliability over time. This study was delimited to a single collegiate flight
school in Florida.
Recommendations for Research and Practice
Recommendations for Research Relative to Study Limitations
Suppose a researcher wished to improve generalizability of findings and
corresponding recommendations. The researcher would have to conduct a new
study using a cluster sample of magneto failure data from two or more flight school
fleets that use Piper aircraft with Slick magnetos. A similar study should examine
and compare the failure frequencies and patterns of other brands of magnetos fitted
to similar training aircraft.
Recommendations for Research Relative to Study Delimitations
Future research should include tracking several more years of magneto
failures in the FITA fleet to determine if any changes made by the manufacturer in
materials, processes, or parts might have reduced the FITA magneto failure rates.
FITA maintenance could collect data for other component failures in other aircraft
systems. Analysis of that data would provide FITA with their failure frequencies
and patterns, including any data related to electronic ignition systems on new
airplanes. Lycoming offers new engines with dual, independent ignition sources as
required by FAR Part 23, but with one source being an electro-mechanical magneto
and the other an electronic ignition system. Electronic ignition systems may offer

152

operating benefits by providing variable timing to coincide with engine RPM and
power demand for the most efficient combustion and power delivery. However,
solid-state electronic ignition systems require an external source of electricity. FAR
Part 23 requirements mean the airplane must have a separate electrical power
source with a second alternator, battery, and voltage regulator providing
redundancy for the ignition system. The manufacturer might conduct a study to
analyze user data following changes to suppliers of components or manufacturing
processes related to the magnetos. Improved availability of tear-down data would
make it possible to do a longitudinal study to examine the effects of changing parts
suppliers could provide the data needed for establishing causal factors more
accurately. Because the researcher did not use a random sample, the results of this
study could not be generalized to other flight schools or other users of the same
aircraft and type of magnetos. Any action on the findings and recommendations
from this study would have to be confined to FITA and followed solely at FITA
management’s discretion. The preceding recommendations for additional research
could, if completed, lead to a better understanding of benefits to FITA and other
GA airplane operators. The results may provide the data to support operatorimposed life limits on additional parts or components to improve service reliability
and avoid the costs of other types of operational failures.
Recommendations for Future Research Relative to Implications
Continued tracking of magneto failure data at FITA could be achieved
relatively easily if the maintenance records system recorded time between failures
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in addition to the time of breakdown. Amending the currently used maintenance
recording system would do this quite easily. The amendment could have a goal of
having a continuous, running indication of failure rates at any time on any related
engine parts or components. Such a system would benefit any company by rapidly
alerting when adverse trends are detected, facilitating interventions before the cost
of failures adversely affect the business.
Recommendations for Practice Relative to Implications
The analysis and conclusions indicate that FITA should consider changing
its magneto overhaul interval. Before FITA commits to the costly change, it should
collect and examine the remainder of 2017 to current 2022 magneto-failure data to
examine whether any known magneto manufacturing process changes have reduced
the frequency of early failures. If failures were reduced, that might pinpoint an
external factor that may have contributed to the increased failure rate experienced
in the last six years of the study. If magneto replacement parts are no longer made
by the original equipment manufacturer, might this reveal an unintended
consequence of the FAA's PMA policy change in 2010?
The FAA should task the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) to
develop a reliability standard for magnetos. About 175,000 GA aircraft in the U.S.
have magnetos. The possibility that these critical engine components may not have
the reliability to last until their first overhaul interval is a significant safety concern.
Schwaner's call to alarm concerning the magneto ignition system requires greater
amplification for the GA community (Schwaner, 1992). Any complacency
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concerning safety-critical aircraft component failures must always be a serious
concern. Few will argue against having more detailed data, improving access to
that data, and allowing industry safety researchers to zero in on potential safety
hazards and mitigation measures.
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Appendix C- MISF Data Collection Form
DATA Source- FITA Engine logbooks Aircraft Number
From__________To_______________

Date Range:
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change,

OPS
Narrative
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